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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the common, yet previously opaque, practice of using non-U.S. audit firms 
(commonly referred to as component auditors) to conduct portions of audit work for U.S. public 
companies. Since the U.S. lead auditor ultimately accepts full responsibility for the resulting audit 
opinion, regulators have expressed concern for the transparency and quality of audits using 
component auditors. Employing data disclosed in the newly-mandated PCAOB Form AP, we find 
that this practice is most common amongst large clients with complex international operations. 
Consistent with regulator concern, we find that the percentage of audit hours conducted by 
component auditors is associated with lower audit quality (i.e., material weakness disclosures and 
restatements), longer audit delay, and higher audit fees. Interestingly, we find that not all 
component auditors are created equal, and that work performed by component auditors that are 
less competent (based on number of CPAs employed and experience leading U.S. audits and in 
the client’s industry) and facing greater coordination and communication challenges (based on the 
country’s rule of law, English language proficiency, and time zone differences from the lead 
auditor) drive the association with adverse audit outcomes. Overall, these findings suggest that the 
use of component auditors is not uniformly detrimental and that Form AP disclosures can help 
interested parties better assess the potential for adverse audit outcomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the use of non-U.S. audit firms, commonly referred to as component auditors, 
on the audits of U.S. public companies.1 Lead U.S. auditors, who ultimately accept full 
responsibility for the resulting audit opinion, often utilize component auditors to conduct audit 
work in countries where clients have significant operations (e.g., Hanes 2013). The Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which is tasked with monitoring auditors of 
U.S. listed companies, now requires details of this common practice to be disclosed in Form AP 
for each public company audit report issued after June 30, 2017. Combined, our data suggests that 
component auditors are responsible for auditing approximately six trillion dollars of U.S. public 
company assets.2 Yet before this disclosure requirement, investors and other interested parties 
were largely unaware of the extent to which component auditors were involved in an audit. This 
information is indicative of potential coordination and communication challenges faced in the 
audit process (e.g., Downey and Bedard 2018; Hanes 2013; Sunderland and Trompeter 2017), 
which may adversely impact audit outcomes.  
Since lead auditors often use component auditors located in countries where their clients 
have significant operations, component auditor use is increasingly prevalent amidst the 
globalization of U.S. public companies. For example, Monsanto, an agricultural biotechnology 
company that sells its products in over 100 countries, is audited by Deloitte’s St. Louis, Missouri 
office. To gather sufficient evidence to support the audit opinion, Deloitte employs five component 
                                                            
1 PCAOB standards use the term “other accounting firm” to refer to public accounting firms that participate in the 
audit other than the firm signing the audit report. To maintain consistency with prior literature (e.g., Carson et al. 
2016; Czerney et al. 2014; Downey and Bedard 2018) and for expositional reasons, we refer to these firms as 
“component auditors” throughout this paper. 
2 The total assets audited by component auditors is an approximation based on the percentage of total audit hours 
conducted by component auditors. When reporting this percentage in Form AP, the lead auditor can report either an 
exact percentage or a predefined range (e.g., “5 percent to less than 10 percent of total audit hours, “10 percent to less 
than 20 percent of total audit hours,” etc.). Nearly 97 percent of Form AP filings report this information as a range. 
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auditors, including, amongst others, its affiliates in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico to conduct 20 
to 45 percent of the total audit hours. While these affiliates operate under the Deloitte global brand, 
they have varied professional standards, familiarity with U.S. audits and the client’s industry, and 
are located in countries with vastly different characteristics than the U.S., including cultural, 
language, and time zone differences. Motivated by examples like this and using Form AP 
disclosures for a broad sample of U.S. public companies, we examine factors associated with 
component auditor use and investigate whether the use, extent of use, and characteristics of these 
component auditors and their location are associated with variations in audit outcomes.  
In our sample of 3,880 unique U.S. public companies, 37.0 percent use at least one 
component auditor. This suggests that component auditor use is a prevalent phenomenon, which 
prior literature has been unable to explore.3 Therefore, we first examine factors associated with the 
use of component auditors. We find that client size, foreign operations, foreign subsidiaries, 
geographic and business segments, and accounting reporting complexity are positively associated 
with the likelihood of component auditor use. Interestingly, we do not find company performance 
or auditor type (i.e., Big 4 vs. non-Big 4) to be significant. These results illustrate that the use of 
component auditors is often unavoidable for clients with complex international operations.  
Next, we consider the impact of component auditor use on audit outcomes. When 
proposing Form AP, the PCAOB cited inspection findings that highlight the coordination and 
communication challenges associated with managing diverse teams of auditors in multiple 
countries (PCAOB 2017; Doty 2017). For instance, the U.S. lead auditor and component auditors 
may operate in environments with different business practices, languages, cultural norms, market 
                                                            
3 Before this mandatory disclosure requirement, prior literature was not able to focus on U.S. component auditor use 
and instead creatively focused on the disclosure of component auditor use (Dee et al. 2015; Mao et al. 2018). However, 
limited disclosure requirements could have resulted in as much as 95 percent of engagements using component 
auditors not being identified. 
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conditions, quality control systems, and professional training and certifications (e.g., Hanes 2013; 
Franzel 2017; Sunderland and Trompeter 2017). While there are also advantages to using 
component auditors (e.g., overcoming jurisdictional hindrances, reducing labor costs, leveraging 
local expertise, etc.), we predict that component auditor use is associated with adverse audit 
outcomes – namely, negatively associated with audit quality and positively associated with audit 
delay and audit fees.4  Although we recognize that the predicted audit outcomes are jointly 
impacted by innate client characteristics and the audit process, PCAOB inspections strongly 
suggest that audit quality issues on component auditor engagements are incremental to the 
financial reporting issues at these companies. For example, in several instances the PCAOB 
reported that component auditors failed to perform appropriate audit procedures and 
misrepresented their work to the lead engagement partner (PCAOB 2018).  Results generally 
support our prediction and are consistent with complex multinational engagements that require 
component auditor use having lower audit quality and higher audit delay and audit fees.  
Recognizing that complex multinational engagements that involve component auditors are 
fundamentally different, moving forward we conduct analysis within a more homogenous sample 
of 1,435 engagements that use at least one component auditor. On average, an audit engagement 
involving component auditors employs 3.6 different component auditors who conduct 18.0 percent 
of total audit hours. Using this information, we are able to distinguish Monsanto’s use of five 
component auditors conducting 20 to 45 percent of audit hours from Chipotle’s use of only one 
component auditor (i.e., different number), and from Microsoft’s use of five component auditors 
that together conduct less than 10 percent of the audit (i.e., different percentage). These newly 
                                                            
4 While higher audit fees can be indicative of greater effort, which may have a positive impact on the audit, we label 
higher audit fees as an inefficient and adverse audit outcome in combination with our prediction of lower audit quality. 
Higher audit fees may also arise from a risk premium related to the management of component auditor work. 
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available data points, which have not been examined by prior literature, allow us to proxy for 
expected coordination and communication challenges and their potential to impact the audit. 
Surprisingly, we generally do not find significant associations between the number of component 
auditors and audit outcomes. In contrast, we find that the percentage of audit hours conducted by 
component auditors is associated with a higher likelihood of material weakness disclosures and 
restatements, higher audit fees, and longer audit delays. Taken together, these results highlight that 
the expected adverse outcomes are generally driven by the percentage of work conducted by 
component auditors, rather than the number of components auditors used.  
Importantly, we explore whether certain characteristics of component auditors used 
exacerbate or mitigate the adverse audit outcomes observed. Working with component auditors in 
certain locations can generate undue coordination and communication challenges, which may 
exacerbate the potential for adverse audit outcomes. Conversely, when managing these 
engagements, the lead auditor is expected to ensure that component auditors possess the 
appropriate independence, competence, and capabilities to serve on the engagement (PCAOB 
2010). This suggests that work performed by competent component auditors may not result in 
adverse audit outcomes.  
For component auditors conducting more than five percent of the audit, which are 
identified by name in Form AP, we construct several proxies for their coordination and 
communication challenges and competence. We proxy for coordination and communication 
challenges using the country’s rule of law, English language proficiency, and time zone difference 
from the lead auditor.  We find that adverse audit outcomes are limited to audit hours conducted 
by component auditors with greater coordination and communication challenges. We proxy for 
competence using manually collected data on the number of CPAs employed, experience leading 
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U.S. audits, and experience in the client’s industry. Across all three competence proxies, we again 
find that significant associations with adverse audit outcomes are limited to audit hours conducted 
by less competent component auditors. These results demonstrate that characteristics of the 
component auditor and their location are important for predicting variations in audit outcomes. 
Since the need to use component auditors appears structural, it is unlikely that lead auditors 
can avoid engaging component auditors in countries with the aforementioned coordination and 
communication challenges.  In additional analyses, we identify a potential alleviating factor 
whereby employing competent component auditors in countries with these challenges can mitigate 
adverse audit implications. Combined, our results suggest that lead auditors can overcome 
challenges associated with these environments by ensuring component auditor teams are 
sufficiently competent. Overall, these findings suggest that the use of certain component auditors 
can overcome financial reporting quality and efficiency issues inherent to complex multinational 
engagements, and that managers, investors, and researchers should consider which component 
auditors are conducting the work when assessing potential risks. 
We address alternative explanations for our results in several ways. First, because client 
characteristics determine the likelihood of component auditor use, we perform most of our 
analyses within a more homogenous sample of firms that use at least one component auditor. To 
further control for innate client characteristics, we employ propensity score matched samples and 
find consistent results. Another alternative explanation is that management in certain countries, 
captured by our coordination and communication proxies, are more likely to engage in earnings 
management irrespective of audit quality (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2012). The 
aforementioned additional analysis shows that the competence of component auditors continues to 
matter even within these countries, suggesting that at least part of our results can be attributed to 
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component auditor influence on audit quality. To reduce the concern that client complexity drives 
our results, we control for multiple measures of firm complexity throughout our analysis. We also 
examine whether our auditor competence results are driven by complexity (i.e., that more 
competent component auditors are assigned to clients with less financial reporting issues). We do 
not find this to be the case, which again demonstrates that competence results are due to component 
auditor characteristics and not innate client characteristics. 
Our study contributes to auditing research in several important ways. We use new Form 
AP data to comprehensively examine the use of component auditors by U.S. lead auditors, which 
was not previously possible. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use this novel data 
to describe the prevalence and magnitude of component auditor use. This new data also provides 
interesting descriptive information on component auditors, their characteristics and location, and 
the extent of their involvement by country. This new disclosure also importantly allows insight 
into the audit team’s judgment of the materiality of foreign operations to the financial statements 
and resulting audit, which measures such as the existence of foreign operations or the number of 
foreign subsidiaries are unable to capture. Indeed, within a sample of firms that use component 
auditors, foreign operations and subsidiaries are generally not associated with audit outcomes.  
We are also the first to examine the determinants of component auditor use and find that 
structural characteristics of the client such as size and complexity, rather than client performance 
or auditor type, explain most of the variation in the use of component auditors. We further 
document that component auditor use, and specifically the amount of work conducted by 
component auditors, is associated with adverse audit outcomes. Notably, our findings on U.S. 
component auditor use differ from prior literature that examines the Australian audit market 
(Carson et al. 2016), U.S. component auditor disclosure using a limited sample (Dee et al. 2015), 
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and survey data (Downey and Bedard 2018). These contrasting findings underscore the importance 
of understanding component auditor use in the new Form AP information environment. We are 
also able to collect other information on component auditors, including their competence and 
coordination and communication challenges faced. As a result, we document that the use of 
component auditors is not uniformly detrimental to the resulting audit, and that work performed 
by competent component auditors can alleviate coordination and communication challenges. 
Overall, we conclude that component auditor information provided in new Form AP 
disclosures is informative and can help interested parties better assess the potential for adverse 
audit outcomes, which may influence their decisions. This supports the PCAOB’s objective to 
increase transparency as to who is conducting U.S. audits and extends a recent literature stream 
which explores the efficacy of PCAOB oversight and standard setting (e.g., Aobdia and Shroff 
2017; Burke, Hoitash and Hoitash 2018; Cunningham, Li, Stein, and Wright 2018; DeFond and 
Lennox 2017; Krishnan, Krishnan, and Song 2017). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related PCAOB 
standards and prior literature and proposes testable research questions and hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the Form AP data and our empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our results, and 
Section 5 is devoted to a discussion of our findings and their implications for research and practice. 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Use of Component Auditors on U.S. Audit Engagements 
Recent reports suggest that 43.2 percent of S&P 500 sales revenue comes from non-U.S. countries 
(S&P Dow Jones Indices 2017). This globalization of U.S. public companies has led to 
geographically distributed audit work, and specifically, the expanded use of other non-U.S. 
auditors in public company audits. When auditing a multinational company, the lead auditor, who 
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ultimately bears responsibility for the entire audit (PCAOB 2010), must engage other auditors to 
gather evidence and perform work on material foreign operations (Hanes 2013).5 With the 
exception of six countries, U.S. auditors are not allowed to perform audit work within foreign 
jurisdictions.6 In addition to component auditors’ proximity to foreign operations, most countries 
require accounting firms to have separate local licenses and professionals in order to practice 
(Carson 2009). For example, the audit of a company such as Monsanto, which sells its products in 
over 100 countries, demands the use of several component auditors in countries with significant 
operations. These other auditors are commonly referred to as “component auditors” in the extant 
literature. 
The type and extent of work conducted by component auditors can vary considerably and 
may include testing an inventory listing or specified account balance in that location, performing 
high-level review procedures, or conducting a full scope audit of a foreign subsidiary that prepares 
standalone financial statements (Barrett et al. 2005; Gunn and Michas 2018). In aggregate, the 
work performed by component auditors can represent a significant portion of the audit (Hanes 
2013). Regardless of the extent of work performed by component auditors, the lead auditor is 
responsible for directing and supervising all work pertaining to the financial statement audit 
opinion (AICPA 2017). However, the lead auditor’s review is often legally restricted to summary 
documentation of the work performed and conclusions reached (AICPA 2017; Downey and 
Bedard 2018; Sunderland and Trompeter 2017).  
                                                            
5 We conduct informal interviews with senior managers involved on audits of multinational corporations, which reveal 
that lead auditors use both quantitative (e.g., revenue by country) and qualitative (e.g., potential to impact risk of 
material misstatement) materiality assessments to determine whether foreign operations should be scoped into the 
overall audit, and thus whether a component auditor should be engaged. Importantly, anecdotes suggest the U.S. lead 
auditor cannot perform remote audit work on foreign transactions, which implies that component auditor use is 
unavoidable for multinational entities with significant foreign operations.  
6 Even within these six countries (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Mexico, and New Zealand) there are 
significant certifications and training requirements which often prevent U.S. auditors from participating in the audit 
(NASBA 2018).  
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In 2016, the PCAOB and SEC passed Rule 3211, which requires disclosure of information 
on the use of component auditors in Form AP for audit reports issued on or after June 30, 2017. 
This disclosure was motivated by a desire for increased transparency regarding who is conducting 
audits. Prior to this disclosure requirement, investors were largely unaware of the extent to which 
component auditors were involved in an audit.7 For example, in recent disclosures Deloitte reports 
that between 20 and 45 percent of Monsanto’s audit is conducted by five different component 
auditors, with a majority conducted by their affiliates in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.8 Despite 
the magnitude of audit work conducted by these affiliates, Deloitte’s Missouri office ultimately 
bears full responsibility for the audit opinion and was previously the only firm name disclosed. 
Prior to the Form AP disclosure requirement, it was not possible to segment U.S. audits 
into those where component auditors were used and those where they were not used. However, 
three studies used various methods to identify certain subsets of audits involving component 
auditors. First, using a sample of Australian listed companies, Carson et al. (2016) examine 
different work arrangements for engagements with foreign subsidiaries (e.g., lead auditor conducts 
all audit work, uses affiliated component auditors, or uses unaffiliated component auditors). 
Second, within a sample of U.S. audits where component auditor use is disclosed, Mao et al. (2018) 
examine both when the lead auditor accepts and divides responsibility.9 Lastly, Dee et al. (2015) 
focus on the disclosure of component auditor use and compare engagements where U.S. lead 
auditors accept responsibility for the work of other auditors to similar engagements (e.g., same 
                                                            
7 Recent experimental research suggests this new information may impact investor behavior. Specifically, Hux (2018) 
finds that non-professional investors invest less in companies when component auditors are involved in an audit versus 
not involved, and that this is more apparent when misstatement risk is higher. 
8 Affiliates operate within a global network of member firms, which operate under a global brand but are separate 
legal entities and are separately licensed in their country of operation (Hanes 2013). The use of affiliate firms is a 
well-known and prevalent phenomenon amongst audits of larger companies and those performed by large accounting 
firms, but is also common amongst small firms who become members of affiliate associations (Bills et al. 2015). 
9 In our study, we focus on engagements where the lead auditor accepts responsibility for the entire audit opinion.  
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lead auditor and similar in percentage of foreign revenue) where component auditors are not 
disclosed. Due to data limitations at the time, the authors were not able to determine whether 
component auditors were not used or merely not disclosed. Specifically, Dee et al. (2015) identify 
a sample of 149 issuers that disclose the use of component auditors using the requirement that 
PCAOB registered audit firms who do not serve as lead auditors on a SEC issuer list the audits in 
which they substantially participate in their Form 2 annual report.10 Therefore, any component 
auditor who also serves as a lead auditor either would not appear in the sample, or could even be 
classified in the no disclosure group. This is a significant difference, because according to the new 
Form AP data, nearly half of component auditors also serve as a lead auditor of a SEC issuer.  For 
instance, major audit firms in Canada, China, and Israel often conduct component work and serve 
as lead auditors for SEC issuers such as IMAX, Lululemon, and Stantec.11   
Now that Form AP requires disclosure of component auditor use for all U.S. issuers, we 
can ensure that the group of audits where component auditors are not disclosed truly do not use 
component auditors. We thus are able to focus on the underlying use, and not merely the disclosure, 
of these component auditors, which was not previously possible. Using this data, we first 
empirically examine factors associated with the use of component auditors. While these have been 
discussed in practitioner and regulator statements, they were not empirically investigated due to 
data limitations.  
 
                                                            
10 Specifically, when audit firms that are PCAOB registered but are not lead auditors on a SEC issuer file their Form 
2, they are required to list audit reports for which they played a substantial role in Item 4.2. A substantial role includes 
performing 20 percent or more of the issuer’s total audit hours or fees. This data, in addition to this information for 
those that do serve as a lead auditor and for those performing any percentage of the audit, is now directly supplied by 
the lead auditor in Form AP.   
11This limitation is not expected to impact the results of market reaction to the disclosure of information as examined 
by Dee et al. (2015) and for conducting certain analyses within the disclosure group (e.g., Mao et al. 2018). However, 
using this data to compare firms that use component auditors with those that do not is not possible and would result 
in biased samples. 
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Use of Component Auditors and Audit Outcomes 
Recent PCAOB oversight activities have identified significant audit deficiencies relating to 
component auditor work and the lead auditor’s oversight of this work (PCAOB 2016; Doty 2016). 
For instance, PCAOB inspections have attributed restatements to component auditors not 
performing procedures requested by the lead auditor or required under PCAOB standards, as well 
as failing to communicate significant issues to the lead auditor (Harris 2016; PCAOB 2018). These 
inspection findings suggest that there are quality concerns for audits using component auditors. In 
2017, the PCAOB also proposed amendments to strengthen auditing standards that govern the 
planning and supervision of audits that involve component auditors (PCAOB 2017). 12 The need 
for this standard is evidence that the PCAOB believes there is varied audit quality, beyond financial 
reporting quality issues that may be inherent to these companies, when lead auditors engage 
component auditors. 
Within limited samples in the pre-disclosure era, prior literature has generally validated 
this regulator concern. For instance, Dee et al. (2015) find that firms that disclose the use of 
component auditors have lower audit quality, as measured by discretionary accruals, than firms 
that do not disclose the use of component auditors.13 Similarly, Carson et al. (2016) find that 
involvement of affiliated component auditors is associated with lower audit quality and higher 
audit fees within a sample of Australian companies.14 
                                                            
12 The referenced proposed standards are expected to improve audit quality across all audit firms and component 
auditors, which biases against finding a cross-sectional association between component auditor use and adverse audit 
outcomes. 
13 Importantly, we expect component audit firms that do not serve as lead auditors for SEC issuers (i.e., the Dee et al. 
2015 sample) to be fundamentally different from those that do. Specifically, these component auditors are small non-
U.S. firms with limited experience on U.S. audits (Dee et al. 2015), which may explain the finding that the disclosure 
of component auditors is associated with adverse audit outcomes. 
14 While Australia has a similar institutional setting to the U.S., a higher cost of living and extensive fee disclosures 
make it difficult to generalize audit fee findings. In a U.S. setting, Dee et al. (2015) do not find differences in audit 
fees between firms that disclose and do not disclose the use of component auditors. 
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Combined, inspection findings and prior literature suggest that component auditor use is 
likely to impact audit outcomes across a broad sample. Advantages of component auditor use 
include overcoming jurisdictional hindrances inherent to multinational companies, as well as 
reduction of labor costs and knowledge sharing via access to personnel who have specific expertise 
and familiarity with the company’s operating environment in that country (e.g., Hanes 2013). 
Former PCAOB member Lewis Ferguson summarized these benefits: 
The use by the lead auditor of such other auditors in an audit, often located in a different country, 
and at times in several different countries, can provide a number of benefits, including competitive 
and efficiency benefits, by allowing lead auditors to leverage the use of locally-licensed auditors. 
The locally licensed auditors may have language skills and knowledge of local culture and business 
practices that can be a great benefit to the lead auditor if properly used and supervised. The use of 
other auditors in a multinational environment, however, also introduces a number of challenges 
that can lead to inadequate audit performance (Ferguson 2016). 
 
This quote also highlights the significant challenges a lead auditor can face when using component 
auditors. While the component auditors’ local presence is an advantage, it also results in 
differences between the U.S. lead audit firm and various component auditors, which can cause 
coordination and communication problems (e.g., Hanes 2013, Franzel 2016, Sunderland and 
Trompeter 2017). These differences are compounded by legal restrictions on work sharing and the 
inherent risks of a geographically dispersed work design, which make it difficult for audit teams 
to observe cues, informally interact, and ultimately understand the interdependence of their work 
(Downey and Bedard 2018; Hanes 2013). Further, constrained resources during audit busy season 
limit the lead auditors’ ability to provide timely feedback to component auditors, as well as travel 
for in-person visits to conduct supervision and coaching. Lastly, component auditors also face 
constrained resources as they are often tasked both with completing component work and serving 
local clients (Sunderland and Trompeter 2017). 
Since the use of component auditors by U.S. auditors was not previously known, it is not 
immediately clear whether and in what direction it will influence audit outcomes across a broad 
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sample. If component auditors are properly used and supervised, the advantages of their use could 
result in competitive and efficiency benefits for the lead audit firm (i.e., increased audit quality 
and decreased audit delay and audit fees). Conversely, without adequate supervision or perhaps 
even with a diligent effort by the lead auditor, deficiencies in the work of component auditors 
arising from coordination and communication challenges can result in deficient audits. Prior 
literature as well as regulator comments, inspection findings, and proposed standards have 
supported this prediction. Specifically, the challenges associated with component auditor use are 
thought to decrease audit quality and efficiencies (i.e., increase audit delay and audit fees). We 
therefore predict the following in our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The use of component auditors is negatively associated with audit quality 
and positively associated with audit delay and audit fees. 
 
Characteristics of Component Auditors Used 
Since component auditor identities are now known, we next consider whether component auditors 
operating in locations with varying coordination and communication challenges and possessing 
varying levels of competence differentially impact audit outcomes.  
Component Auditor Coordination and Communication Challenges 
Component auditors operate in many different countries, from the Cayman Islands to Belgium, 
China, Egypt, Greece, Italy, Switzerland, Vietnam, and many more. As mentioned previously, 
differences between the U.S. lead audit firm and component auditors operating in these various 
countries can result in coordination and communication challenges. This was highlighted in a 
recent PCAOB speech: 
When a lead auditor engages other auditors in (sometimes many) different countries, new 
challenges are injected into the audit. These challenges can be associated with different languages, 
business practices, cultural norms, and market conditions in different countries, as well as different 
quality control systems and professional training of staff in different audit firms. Meanwhile, the 
evolution of auditing standards and auditing practices that address the auditor’s performance 
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requirements and expectations under such circumstances has varied, increasing the risk of 
variability in audit quality (Franzel 2016). 
 
While operating in diverse and remote environments, it can be difficult for the lead and component 
auditor teams to overcome challenges and establish norms and a shared understanding (e.g., Barrett 
et al. 2005; Hanes 2013).  
 For instance, when evaluating component auditors, the lead auditor is expected to 
understand their compliance with ethics and whether they operate in a regulatory environment that 
actively oversees auditors (AICPA 2017). Cultural differences such as these can reflect team 
members’ attitudes, namely obedience and trust, towards authority (Berry et al. 2010), and 
therefore may lead certain component auditors to cut corners when following lead auditor 
instruction as well as adhering to professional standards. This concern was highlighted in recent 
sanctions against Deloitte’s Mexico affiliate, which are summarized by PCAOB Acting Director 
of Enforcement and Investigations: “the three Deloitte Mexico partners sanctioned today not only 
failed to perform appropriate procedures in a critical audit area, but also compounded their 
failures by telling the principal auditor that they had done work that they, in fact, had not done” 
(PCAOB 2018).  Instances like this can be detrimental to audit outcomes if lead auditors put undue 
trust in audit work performed by component auditors, which may contain errors or not be 
performed in accordance with auditing standards. 
Additionally, the effectiveness of audit work using component auditors depends crucially 
on communication between the lead and component auditors (e.g., Barrett et al. 2015; Hanes 2013; 
Sunderland and Trompeter 2017). The lead auditor may often work with component auditors in 
countries with different native languages and varied levels of English proficiency. Component 
auditor teams with low English proficiency may have difficulty following the lead auditor’s 
direction and miss information and salience cues, causing information relevant to the audit opinion 
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to not be conveyed to the lead auditor (Downey and Bedard 2018; Hanes 2013). PCAOB oversight 
activities have found lead auditor failures in supervising component auditor work when there were 
language barriers (PCAOB 2013). Further, the lead auditor and component auditor teams may 
experience vast time differences. Timely communication amongst these teams is important for 
effective resolution of issues that arise throughout the audit process (AICPA 2017), and significant 
time differences may hinder this communication. 
Of course, coordination and communication problems may not heterogeneously arise 
across all countries in which component auditors are used. For example, certain countries such as 
the United Kingdom or Australia are more similar to the U.S. in cultural norms and communication 
preferences. We therefore expect that work performed by component auditors facing greater 
coordination and communication challenges will drive the negative association with audit quality 
and positive association with audit fees and audit delay predicted in Hypothesis 1.15 
Hypothesis 2: The predicted association with adverse audit outcomes is more pronounced 
when there are more, relative to less, coordination and communication challenges. 
 
Component Auditor Competence 
In addition to coordination and communication challenges, the competence of component auditors 
employed may vary. When selecting and retaining component auditors, the lead auditor must 
ensure that component auditors are independent and possess the appropriate competence and 
capabilities. Specifically, the lead auditor is permitted to express an opinion on the financial 
statements as a whole if they are able to satisfy themselves as to the ethics, independence, and 
professional reputation (including their knowledge of the professional standards, skill, and ability) 
of component auditors used (PCAOB 2010; PCAOB 2016).  
                                                            
15 For expositional reasons, we refer to these associations as “adverse audit outcomes” in Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
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 PCAOB standards suggest the lead auditor confirm component auditor familiarity with 
U.S. GAAP, generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), and relevant SEC requirements in 
their evaluation of competence.16 For example, familiarity may be indicated by their experience 
conducting U.S. audit work (i.e., applying the referenced standards, rules, and regulations) or their 
relevant professional certifications, such as a CPA or equivalent (Dee et al. 2015; Nagy et al. 
2018).17 Regulators have also expressed concern over component auditors lacking the industry 
experience necessary to perform work requested by the lead auditor  (AICPA 2017; PCAOB 2016). 
In sum, the competence of component auditors is clearly an important factor when managing a 
complex multinational audit, a notion confirmed by respondents to the Downey and Bedard (2018) 
questionnaire. We therefore predict the following: 
Hypothesis 3: The predicted association with adverse audit outcomes is more pronounced 
when less, relative to more, competent component auditors are used. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample Selection 
We begin our data collection by identifying a sample of U.S. public companies subject to the Form 
AP component auditor disclosure requirement. Specifically, we identify Form AP filings for audit 
reports issued after June 30, 2017, which includes fiscal year ends between April 2017 and March 
2018.18 We then restrict our sample to 3,880 U.S. issuers with a U.S. lead auditor and necessary 
data in Compustat and Audit Analytics.  
                                                            
16 This is consistent with responses to the Downey and Bedard (2018) questionnaire, where component auditor 
knowledge, measured using their understanding of GAAP, GAAS, the regulatory environment, and the client’s 
industry, is thought to reduce coordination and communication challenges on multinational audits. 
17 While Dee et al. (2015) do not find this to be a significant characteristic in their subset of firms that disclose 
component auditor use, recent studies find local education levels and professional certifications of relevant individuals 
to be informative characteristics (e.g., Beck et al. 2017; Hoitash et al. 2016; Ge et al. 2011; Prawitt et al. 2009). Nagy 
et al. (2018) find that the number of CPAs in U.S. audit firm offices is positively associated with audit quality, 
measured by the likelihood of restatements and discretionary accruals.  
18 Form AP filings are collected from the AuditorSearch database made available by the PCAOB 
(https://pcaobus.org/Pages/AuditorSearch.aspx).  
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The lead auditors of all companies in this initial sample are required to report information 
on component auditor use (if any) in Items 4.1 and 4.2 of engagement-specific Form AP filings. 
Specifically, in Item 4.1 lead auditors report the legal name, extent of participation19, city, state, 
and country for each component auditor that individually contributes five percent or more of total 
audit hours. In Item 4.2 lead auditors report the number and aggregate percentage of component 
auditors that individually contribute less than five percent of total audit hours.20 These filings 
indicate that 1,435 (37.0 percent) of the 3,880 engagements use at least one component auditor 
and 906 use at least one component auditor that contributes five percent or more of total audit 
hours. Since the latter sample identifies component auditors by name, it is used in our 
characteristics analyses (H2 and H3). The derivations of our samples are reported in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Component Auditor Variables 
The first test variable used in analysis for H1 is COMPONENT-USE, which is an indicator variable 
equal to one if at least one component auditor participated on the engagement, and zero otherwise. 
For engagements where component auditors are used, we create two additional variables. 
COMPONENT-NUMBER is a count variable for the total number of component auditors that 
participated on the audit. COMPONENT-PCT is the total percentage of audit hours conducted by 
component auditors. 
To test H2, we use three proxies for coordination and communication challenges. To 
capture cultural and regulatory differences between U.S. and component auditor locations, we 
                                                            
19 Lead auditors have the option to report the extent of participation as either an exact percentage or a range of the 
percentage of audit hours (e.g., “5 percent to less than 10 percent of total audit hours,” “10 percent to less than 20 
percent of total audit hours,” etc.). When the range is reported, we use the midpoint in our calculations. For example 
“10 percent to less than 20 percent of total audit hours” becomes 15 percent. 
20 Appendix A provides an example of Items 4.1 and 4.2 from Monsanto’s 2017 Form AP filing. 
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collect the country’s rule of law.21 Language barriers are measured by the English language 
proficiency22 of the component auditor’s country of operation and additional communication 
issues by the time zone difference between the lead and component auditor offices.23 To capture 
the amount of work done by component auditors with more or less challenges, we split the 
percentage of audit hours conducted by separately listed component auditors in two mutually 
exclusive variables capturing the percentage of audit hours performed by component auditors 
scoring high and low based on these three proxies.24 We consider component auditors with 
coordination and communication challenges to be those with below average rule of law (LOW-
RULEOFLAW) and English language proficiency (LOW-ENGLISH) and above average time zone 
differences (HIGH-TIMEDIFF). The counterparts to these variables are HIGH-RULEOFLAW, 
HIGH-ENGLISH, and LOW-TIMEDIFF. Since one engagement could use several different 
component auditors, these sets of measures allow us to split the percentage of work conducted by 
component auditors with and without each characteristics. For example, if 40 percent of audit 
hours are conducted by component auditors, 15 percent could be classified as low (e.g., LOW-
TIMEDIFF) and 25 percent as high (e.g., HIGH-TIMEDIFF). 
 To test H3, we similarly create variables capturing the percentage of audit hours performed 
by component auditors scoring high and low on three proxies for competence. Motivated by 
                                                            
21 This country-specific measure of cultural differences is collected from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
project (Kaufman et al. 2010). The rule of law metric “reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (WGI 2016). The 2016 rule of law metric 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 and is available for all countries in our sample. We assume that this metric is relevant to the 
component auditors’ 2017 culture and business practices in their country. 
22 We measure English language proficiency by collecting data on the percentage of the country’s population that 
speaks English from several sources (e.g., EF 2017). 
23 Time zone data is obtained from a flight and airport location database available at https://openflights.org. While we 
consider an above average time zone difference to represent a coordination and communication challenge, it is 
conversely possible that a large time difference increases productivity because work is being conducted continuously. 
24 Since component auditors that individually conduct less than five percent of the audit are reported in aggregate in 
Item 4.2 of Form AP, we cannot identify their characteristics and therefore cannot incorporate them in these cross-
sectional analysis.  
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PCAOB standards, which suggest the lead auditor confirm component auditor professional 
reputation and familiarity with U.S. GAAP and GAAS, we measure competence using the number 
of personnel with a CPA or comparable license25, experience leading U.S. audits (based on 
aggregate U.S. assets as lead auditor), and experience conducting audit work in the client’s 
industry (i.e., either a lead or component auditor on at least one additional client). For each 
measure, we consider less competent (more competent) component auditors to be those with below 
(above) average values within the sample and refer to these variables as LOW-CPAS (HIGH-
CPAS), LOW-USASSETS (HIGH-USASSETS), and NO-INDEXPERIENCE (IND-EXPERIENCE), 
respectively.  
Dependent Variables 
As recommended by DeFond and Zhang (2014), we employ five different dependent variables 
throughout our analyses, including three measures of audit quality as well as audit delay and audit 
fees. Using multiple dependent variables in our analyses allows for the triangulation of results and 
the potential to provide a consistent and comprehensive story.  
The first measure is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that report a material 
weakness in their internal controls (MW), and zero otherwise. Second, RESTATEMENT is an 
indicator variable equal to one for firms that have subsequently restated their annual or quarterly 
filings, and zero otherwise.26 Third, we employ the absolute value of discretionary accruals (DISC-
ACC). We follow Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) and calculate DISC-ACC controlling for 
firm performance. A higher value of any of these measures is indicative of lower financial 
                                                            
25 We manually collect this data for each component auditor registered with the PCAOB from their annual Form 2 
filing (Item 6.1). Since this data is not available for component auditors that are not registered with the PCAOB, we 
assume they fall in the below average number of CPAs group. 
26 Because restatements are often detected and disclosed in future years, it is likely that our measure is significantly 
underestimated, which should bias against finding results. 
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reporting and audit quality. AUDIT-DELAY is the number of days between the fiscal year end and 
the audit report date minus the SEC’s filing deadline (60, 75, and 90 days for large accelerated, 
accelerated, and non-accelerated, respectively). Lower AUDIT-DELAY is often indicative of a 
more efficient audit.  Lastly, AUDIT-FEES is the natural log of audit fees, which serves as a proxy 
for audit cost and audit effort.   
Control Variables 
We employ a common set of control variables across all of our models, which includes controls 
for size, complexity, financial performance, and several other common variables (e.g. Hay, 
Knechel, and Wong 2006; Hoitash and Hoitash 2018).  We control for company size (SIZE) and 
firm complexity with several variables, including the number of business segments (BUS-SEG), 
the number of geographic segments (GEO-SEG)27, an indicator for foreign operations (FOREIGN-
OPERATIONS), the number of foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES), and the number 
of U.S. subsidiaries (US-SUBSIDIARIES).28 We also control for accounting reporting complexity 
(ARC) which captures the amount of accounting disclosures in annual filings. Additional control 
variables and their definitions are provided in Appendix B. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles and all models also include two-digit SIC industry fixed effects.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Before the Form AP requirement, the use, extent of use, and characteristics of component auditors 
were not publicly known. Our sample includes 3,880 companies, of which 37.0 percent use 
                                                            
27 It is not possible to map geographic segments to component auditor data. Specifically, data on geographic segments 
is typically more aggregated. For example, one company can list Asia as one of its geographic segments, while another 
can separately report information on Japan and China. Our component auditor data is unique as it reveals the auditors 
perception of the materiality and risk of certain geographic locations. 
28 We collect subsidiary information using SeekEdgar. While companies are required to report the number of foreign 
subsidiaries and this is important to control for in our context, they do not report the extent of operations in these 
countries. Because many firms report more than 20 foreign subsidiaries, it is unlikely that all are materially significant. 
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component auditors. Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics within the sample of 1,435 
engagements that use at least one component auditor. We observe that the mean (median) number 
of components used on an audit engagement is 3.6 (2.0), ranging from one to 19. The mean 
(median) percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors is 18.0 (15.0), ranging from 
one to 70 percent.  To proxy for the materiality of audit hours conducted by these component 
auditors, we multiply the percentage each component auditor is responsible for on a given 
engagement by total assets of that engagement. Combined, component auditors are responsible for 
auditing approximately six trillion dollars of assets in our sample, which is economically 
meaningful. 
[Insert Table 2] 
906 engagements, or 63.1 percent of those using component auditors, have at least one 
component auditor individually responsible for more than five percent of the audit, and thus 
separately disclosed. Within this sample, an average of 1.7 separately listed component auditors 
are used to conduct 21.6 percent of audit hours. Table 2, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for 
the 303 unique component auditors identified. The mean (median) number of engagements that 
these component auditors are involved with is 5.0 (2.0), and ranges from 1 to 48. Of these 
component auditors, 92.7 percent are part of an affiliate network, 62.0 percent are affiliates of a 
Big 4 auditor, and 45.2 percent also serve as lead auditors on a U.S. issuer. The latter group did 
not previously disclose their component auditor work and would be excluded from the Dee et al. 
(2015) and Mao et al. (2018) treatment samples. Further, the mean number of years that component 
auditors have been registered with the PCAOB is 11.5.29   
                                                            
29 We also recognize that the PCAOB is not allowed to inspect audit firms in certain countries. Our results are robust 
to controlling for engagements where more than 20 percent of audit hours are conducted by component auditors 
located in countries  
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Panel B also shows that 60.4 (47.5) percent of unique component auditors operate in 
countries with high rule of law (English language proficiency) and 38.9 percent have an above 
average time difference from the lead auditor’s office. 22.1 percent of unique component auditors 
have an above average number of CPAs, 10.9 percent serve as the lead auditor on an above average 
amount of U.S. assets, and 22.1 percent have experience as either a component or lead auditor in 
the client’s industry. Variables used to test H2 and H3, which disaggregate the percentage of audit 
hours into those conducted by component auditors with more or less coordination and 
communication challenges and by more and less competent component auditors are built from 
these cutoffs. Table 2, Panel A  presents descriptives for these variables.  
Table 2, Panel C presents descriptive statistics of unique component auditors by the country 
in which they operate.30  For ease of presentation, we separately display countries with three or 
more unique components and aggregate countries with less. We observe that the U.K. is most 
represented, with 13 component auditors involved in 226 engagements. This is followed by 
Germany and China. Countries like Belarus, Egypt and Vietnam have only one component auditor, 
and each is involved in only one audit engagement. Using the percentage of audit hours conducted 
as a proxy for percentage of assets audited, we observe that component auditors in the U.K. are 
responsible for auditing 1.16 trillion dollars, followed by almost 400 billion in Japan and 237 
billion in Mexico. Germany and China’s component auditors, although involved in more 
engagements than Japan or Mexico, are responsible for auditing less in assets (109 and 115 billion 
dollars, respectively). Overall, these descriptives illustrate that component auditors are involved 
in auditing a significant amount of assets, which could have a consequential effect on the audit.  
                                                            
30 While PCAOB standards and prior literature focus on the use of non-U.S. component auditors, there are nine 
engagements in our sample that use a U.S.-based component auditor. Our results are consistent if these engagements 
are removed from the sample. 
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Lastly, Table 2, Panel D presents descriptives of our dependent and control variables. Of 
the 3,880 companies in our sample, 13.6 and 3.4 percent disclose an internal controls material 
weakness or had a restatement of their financials, respectively. According to sample means, the 
level of discretionary accruals is 0.08231, companies report their financials seven days before their 
deadline, and audit fees are 2.5 million dollars. Descriptives for control variables are also displayed 
and are consistent with prior literature.32 
Multivariate Results 
Factors Associated with Component Auditor Use 
Our first set of models examine factors associated with the use of component auditors, which was 
not previously possible before the Form AP disclosure requirement. Column 1 of Table 3 shows 
results of a logistic regression model where the dependent variable is an indicator for 
COMPONENT-USE.33 Results show that the likelihood of using a component auditor increases 
with SIZE, LOSS, LEVERAGE, INV-REC, BIG4, and AGE. 
[Insert Table 3] 
In Column 2 we add six different measures of firm complexity to the model and find that 
each is significantly associated with the likelihood of using a component auditor. Specifically, we 
find that BUS-SEG, GEO-SEG, FOREIGN-OPERATIONS, FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES, and ARC 
are each associated with an increased likelihood that a component auditor is involved (p<.05 or 
less). The number of US-SUBSIDIARIES is inversely associated with the use of component 
auditors, likely because it captures firms with more operations in the U.S. Interestingly, all 
                                                            
31 The sample of discretionary accruals is smaller because we do not include firms in financial industries or industries 
with less than 20 engagements.  
32 The variance inflation factors (VIFs) are below 10 in all of our models, with the highest VIF being 4.71. We therefore 
conclude that mulicollinearity does not substantially impact the interpretation of our results (Cohen et al. 2003).  
33 The number of observations will differ across logit models because observations are automatically dropped when 
any independent variable perfectly predicts (success or failure) the dependent variable. 
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variables from Column 1 other than SIZE and INV-REC are no longer significant when the 
complexity variables are included in Column 2.34 This suggests that the structure of firms, rather 
than their financial performance or auditor choice, is the primary determinant of component 
auditor use.35 This is consistent with practitioner statements that component auditor use is 
unavoidable for companies with significant foreign operations. 
Component Auditor Use and Audit Outcomes 
Our first hypothesis predicts that the use of component auditors will be associated with lower audit 
quality, longer audit delays, and higher audit fees. We first test this hypothesis using an indicator 
for component auditor use (COMPONENT-USE) in Table 4. Results in Column 1 of Panel A show 
that COMPONENT-USE is associated with increased likelihood to disclose a MW (p<0.01). 
Columns 2 and 3 show no significant association between COMPONENT-USE and 
RESTATEMENT or DISC-ACC. However, we do find that COMPONENT-USE is associated with 
longer AUDIT-DELAY and higher AUDIT-FEES (p<0.10 and p<0.01, respectively).36  
[Insert Table 4] 
Overall, results indicate some adverse consequences, primarily for audit pricing and 
efficiency, for engagements that use component auditors compared to those where component 
                                                            
34 It is not surprising that SIZE remains significant because it also captures firm and audit complexity. Further, the 
positive sign on INV-REC is likely attributed to the fact that many component auditors are responsible for performing 
audits of inventory listings in their location (e.g., Barrett et al. 2005; Gunn and Michas 2018). 
35 The explanatory power of the model in Column 2 is 41.0 percent, which is not trivial. We also estimate the two 
models without industry fixed effects (not tabled) and observe that the explanatory power in columns 1 and 2 are 8.6 
and 37.4 percent respectively, further underscoring that the likelihood of component auditor use is mostly explained 
by the six complexity variables and not by company performance or by industry.  
 
36 Results are also economically significant. For Column 1, we calculate the economic significance as the change in 
the likelihood of MW when COMPONENT-USE moves from zero to one, with all other variables are measured at their 
sample means. An audit engagement involving at least one component auditor is associated with a 39.97 percent 
increase in the likelihood of material weakness disclosure. We calculate economic significance by dividing the 
increased likelihood to disclose a MW when using a component auditor (3.79 percent) by the unconditional likelihood 
of MW in our sample (9.49 percent). Further, engagements using component auditor’s experience 11.17 percent longer 
audit delay and $134,879 higher audit fees relative to the sample means. 
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auditors are not used. These results are similar to Carson et al. (2016) which finds higher audit fees 
for Australian engagements using component auditors, but in contrast to Dee et al. (2015) which 
finds that firms disclosing the use of component auditors had higher discretionary accruals and no 
difference in audit fees when compared to those that did not disclose. This illustrates that audit 
firms that were previously required to disclose their work as component auditors (i.e., small non-
U.S. firms with limited experience on U.S. audits) are fundamentally different than the broader 
sample of component auditors.  
Although our model includes controls for firm size and complexity, it is possible that the 
observed results are nonetheless attributed to the client’s innate characteristics (e.g., complexity, 
foreign operations, financial reporting quality) and not to the use of component auditors. This is 
of particular concern since the determinants analysis in Table 3 suggests that component auditor 
use is structural. To further explore whether component auditor use has an impact on these audit 
outcomes incremental to the client characteristics, we employ a propensity score matched sample. 
To create the matched sample, we identify engagements with a similar likelihood to use a 
component auditor, resulting in 639 treatment and 639 control engagements.37 Results using this 
matched sample are reported in Table 4, Panel B and are consistent with Panel A.  
Number of component auditors used. While propensity score matching alleviates some 
concern, in remaining analysis we limit our sample to a more homogenous sample of firms that 
use at least one component auditor. Table 5 presents results examining the association between 
COMPONENT-NUMBER and audit outcomes. Surprisingly, the only significant association we 
                                                            
37 We use a caliper distance of 0.01 without replacement to identify matches. The covariance balance affirms the 
success of the matching procedures, indicating that none of the control variables are statistically different between the 
treatment and control engagements. In order to retain a balanced sample throughout analyses, we do not include 
industry fixed effects in the logit models (Columns 1 and 2). Results are consistent if industry fixed effects are included 
in these models. 
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observe is with audit fees, where the number of components is associated with higher audit fees 
(p<0.01).  The lack of audit quality and delay findings are unexpected given that respondents to 
the Downey and Bedard (2018) experiential questionnaire perceived that a greater number of 
component auditors increased coordination and communication issues. When triangulated with 
our findings, albeit recognizing the constraints of our different samples and research methods, this 
suggests that issues generated from a greater number of component auditors either do not 
generalize to a broader sample or are remediated before they adversely impact audit quality and 
efficiency. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors. In Table 6 we investigate 
the association between the percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors and audit 
outcomes. This table generally indicates support for the hypothesis, with Panel A showing that 
COMPONENT-PCT is significant and positively associated with MW, RESTATEMENT, AUDIT-
DELAY, and AUDIT-FEES (p<0.01; p<0.05; p<0.01; p<0.01, respectively). These results are also 
economically significant. For Columns 1 and 2 we calculate economic significance as the change 
in the likelihood of MW (RESTATEMENT) when COMPONENT-PCT moves from the 25th 
percentile to the 75th percentile. Holding all other variables at their sample mean, we observe a 
40.04 (65.43) percent increase in the likelihood of MW (RESTATEMENT). Further, audit delay is 
17.6 percent longer and audit fees are 7.48 percent higher when moving from the 25th to 75th 
percentile of COMPONENT-PCT. 
[Insert Table 6] 
 In Table 6, Panel B we use a second propensity score matched sample to further control 
for client characteristics. Specifically, we create a matched sample of firms with high and low 
27 
 
percentages of work conducted by component auditors (i.e., COMPONENT-PCT above and below 
the median, respectively). The matching procedure, which uses the same criteria as described 
earlier, results in a sample of 403 treatment and 403 control engagements. None of the control 
variables are significantly different across the treatment and control sample. Results in Panel B 
show that MW, RESTATEMENT, AUDIT-DELAY, and AUDIT-FEES all increase with 
COMPONENT-PCT (p<0.01; p<0.05; p<0.01; p<0.01). This analysis provides further assurance 
that even within a sample of engagements that are equally complex, the percentage of audit hours 
conducted by component auditors impacts audit outcomes. 
Overall, we conclude that results, using multiple test variables, show substantial support 
for H1. Taken together, results in Tables 5 and 6 document that while the number of components 
is only informative for audit pricing, the percentage of audit hours conducted by component 
auditors better captures the extent of challenges faced in audits that involve diverse teams of 
auditors.  
Component Auditor Coordination and Communication Challenges 
In H2, we predict that not all component auditors are created equal, and that those facing greater 
coordination and communication challenges can result in more pronounced adverse audit 
outcomes. This analysis is conducted within the sample of 906 engagements where at least one 
component auditor is separately listed on Form AP, and thus its identity is publicly available.38  
                                                            
38 Within this sample, the percentage conducted by separately listed component auditors is positively associated with 
MW, RESTATEMENT and AUDIT-DELAY. Separately listed component auditors by definition contribute more audit 
hours to the engagement, and these results suggest that their coordination and communication challenges have negative 
impacts on audit quality and audit efficiency. This percentage is not associated with audit fees, which is also true 
throughout our results for H2 and H3. This suggests that engagements with separately listed components are not 
costlier than audits with component auditors that are not separately listed, which are captured by the intercept. The 
interpretation of the audit fee results for the percentage not separately listed are similar to findings for COMPONENT-
NUMBER in H1. 
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Results in Table 7, Panel A show that the LOW-RULEOFLAW is associated with greater 
MW and RESTATEMENT likelihood and longer AUDIT-DELAY (p<0.01; p<0.10; p<0.01).39 
HIGH-RULEOFLAW is insignificant throughout, thus lending support for H2 that the predicted 
negative effects of using component auditors are more pronounced when audit hours are conducted 
by components in low rule of law countries. This finding supports the notion that cultural 
differences between the U.S. lead audit firm and component auditors operating in various countries 
can result in adverse audit outcomes. 
[Insert Table 7] 
In Panel B, we find that LOW-ENGLISH is positively associated with MW, 
RESTATEMENT, and AUDIT-DELAY (p<0.01; p<0.10; p<0.01, respectively), while HIGH-
ENGLISH is not significant in any of the models. These results suggest that communication with 
component auditors operating in countries with low English proficiency generates adverse audit 
implications, while employing component auditors in countries with high English proficiency is 
not significantly different from the lead auditor performing all of the audit work. Findings of this 
analysis support predictions that language differences can cause communication difficulties (e.g., 
Barrett et al. 2015; Hanes 2013; Sunderland and Trompeter 2017), and are in contrast to responses 
to the Downey and Bedard (2018) experiential questionnaire, where language barriers were not 
perceived to be influential in engagements.40 
                                                            
39 We do not find a significant association between LOW-RULEOFLAW and discretionary accruals. This is in contrast 
to Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2012) who find that countries with low rule of law have a higher likelihood of 
earnings management. One major difference in these tests is that we capture the significance of foreign operations, 
via the percentage of audit work conducted in these countries, whereas they measure whether a foreign subsidiary is 
located in these countries. Nevertheless, we control for the number of foreign subsidiaries in all of our models. 
40 There are several possible explanations for our different findings, including that the respondents in Downey and 
Bedard (2018) are U.S. senior managers who likely only communicate with component auditor management and are 
less likely to notice language barriers. Further, we employ different samples (147 versus 906), dependent variables 
(communication and coordination issues versus audit outcomes), and research methods (experiential questionnaire 
versus archival). 
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In Panel C, we again find consistent results. Specifically, HIGH-TIMEDIFF is again 
positively associated with MW, RESTATEMENT, and AUDIT-DELAY (p<0.10; p<0.05; p<0.01, 
respectively). This suggests that challenges arising from delayed communication ultimately 
prevent the resolution of audit issues. Surprisingly, LOW-TIMEDIFF is also significantly 
associated with AUDIT-DELAY (p<0.10). In combination with a lack of audit quality findings, this 
suggests that certain efficiencies are lost when a majority of work is conducted in the same 
workday. 
Component Auditor Competence 
In Table 8 we focus on variations in component auditor competence. Results in Panel A show that 
LOW-CPAS is associated with higher likelihood to disclose a MW, greater propensity for 
RESTATEMENT, and longer AUDIT-DELAY (p<0.05; p<0.05; p<0.01, respectively).   HIGH-
CPAS is not significantly associated with any of the dependent variables. Panel B displays results 
using LOW-USASSETS and HIGH-USASSETS, which mimic Panel A, and suggest that work 
performed by those with less experience auditing U.S. clients drive the higher likelihood to 
disclose a MW, greater propensity for RESTATEMENT, and longer AUDIT-DELAY (p<0.05; 
p<0.10; p<0.05, respectively). Interestingly, HIGH-USASSETS is also positively associated with 
AUDIT-DELAY (p<0.05), which suggests that conducting both component and lead auditor work 
constrains resources.  Results for NO-INDEXPERIENCE and INDEXPERIENCE are displayed in 
Panel C and are again consistent, suggesting that a lack of experience in the client’s industry is 
associated with lower audit quality and longer audit delay. 
[Insert Table 8] 
 Overall, using all three measurements of competence, results suggest that work performed 
by more competent component auditors is not statistically different from work performed by the 
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lead audit firm. In contrast, work performed by less competent component auditors is driving the 
association with adverse audit outcomes.  This auditor-level analysis addresses the concern that 
results are explained by innate characteristics and financial reporting issues of firms with 
multinational operations that require component auditor use. Specifically, by focusing on lead 
auditor characteristics which influence the audit process, rather than those of the component 
auditor which may reflect innate characteristics of the client and the location of its operations, we 
can attribute our results to audit quality rather than financial reporting quality. 
Additional Analysis and Robustness 
Employing Competent Component Auditors to Mitigate Challenges 
Findings of Table 7 suggest that employing component auditors in countries with coordination and 
communication challenges is associated with adverse audit outcomes. However, as documented in 
Table 3, component auditor use is driven by firm size, complexity, and the existence and diversity 
of foreign operations. Therefore, lead auditors may not have a choice of where to employ 
component auditors. In this additional analysis, we explore whether employing competent 
component auditors can remediate the challenges associated with operating in countries with low 
rule of law, low English language proficiency, and large time differences from the lead auditor.  
In Table 9, we disaggregate the percentage of work performed by component auditors with 
each challenge into the percentage conducted by competent component auditors and conducted by 
less competent component auditors. We determine this split based on whether the component 
auditor meets at least two of the three competence criteria used to test H3 (i.e., employs above 
average number of CPAs, is the lead auditor on an above average amount of assets of U.S. issuers, 
and has experience as either a lead or component auditor on at least one additional client in the 
same industry). 
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[Insert Table 9] 
We find that work performed by less competent component auditors in countries with low 
rule of law, low English language proficiency, and large time differences (Panels A, B, and C, 
respectively) is generally associated with adverse audit outcomes. Surprisingly, these variables are 
all negatively associated with AUDIT-FEES, perhaps suggesting less effort is exerted in 
challenging locations when the component auditor lacks competence, which explains the adverse 
audit outcomes. Importantly, adverse outcomes are generally not observed in challenging locations 
when the auditor is more competent. The one exception is positive associations with AUDIT-FEES, 
which compared to the finding for less competence, suggests that more effort is exerted and audit 
quality issues are mitigated when a competent component auditor is employed in challenging 
locations. Therefore, we conclude that using more competent component auditors can help to 
overcome certain country-specific challenges, which are determined by the materiality of client 
foreign operations. These results also alleviate the concern that financial reporting issues inherent 
to complex multinational engagements, and specifically to those with operations in countries with 
low rule of law or English proficiency, drive our main results. If that were the case, we would not 
find that competent component auditors alleviate challenges in these countries. 
Further Controlling for Client Complexity 
In H3, we conclude that work performed by less competent component auditors is driving the 
association with adverse audit outcomes. An alternative explanation for this result is that these 
component auditors are more likely to work on complex firms, which are also more likely to 
experience adverse audit outcomes. To explore this omitted correlated variable, we correlate the 
aggregate competence measure with six firm complexity measures (i.e, BUS-SEG, GEO-SEG, 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS, FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES, US-SUBSIDIARIES, ARC). We observe 
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that the percentage of work performed by competent (less competent) component auditors is 
positively (negatively) associated with all (four out of the six) complexity measures. Since 
complexity is associated with adverse audit outcomes, this biases against our competence finding 
and partially alleviates concern that results are driven by innate firm characteristics rather than 
auditor characteristics.41     
Alternative Component Auditor Characteristics 
In untabulted analyses, we consider two additional component auditor characteristics. First, we 
consider an additional coordination and communication challenge by calculating the distance in 
miles between the nearest airports to lead auditor and component auditors, which is a factor that 
may impact in-person supervision and coaching (PCAOB 2016). For brevity, we do not include 
this characteristic in main analyses as it shares similar predictions to time zone differences. In 
untabulated analyses, we similarly find that adverse audit outcomes are driven by work performed 
by component auditors with above average distance from the lead auditor. Second, in addition to 
measuring experience on U.S. audits using aggregate assets as a lead auditor (Table 8, Panel B), 
we consider whether the component auditor conducts component work on an above average 
amount of assets. Untabulated results using this alternative competence measure are consistent. 
CONCLUSION 
In 2017, the PCAOB’s Form AP requirement introduced new data to auditing research and the 
capital markets. Specifically, lead auditors on U.S. issuers are now required to disclose the use, 
extent of use, and identity of component auditors, which the PCAOB refers to as “other accounting 
firms.” Recent PCAOB inspections identify significant audit deficiencies relating to component 
                                                            
41 We note that within this more homogenous sample of firms that use at least one component, the number of 
geographic segments and foreign subsidiaries do not exhibit significant and consistent association with audit 
outcomes. This suggests that the percentage of work performed by components better captures the materiality of these 
operations to the audit. 
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auditor work and the lead auditors’ oversight of this work (PCAOB 2016; Doty 2016; Harris 2016). 
Therefore, these new disclosures could be informative when assessing audit outcomes. 
Prompted by this regulator concern and the new Form AP disclosure requirements, we 
examine factors associated with component auditor use, and whether this use is associated with 
audit outcomes. At the outset, we find that the likelihood of using a component auditor is associated 
with company structural properties, such as size, complexity, and foreign operations. Audit 
engagements that involve significant component auditor work are associated with a higher 
likelihood of material weakness disclosure, longer audit delays, and higher audit fees. This 
information was not available prior to the new disclosure requirement and can be informative to 
interested parties when assessing the audit. 
To further explore this finding, we collect information on component auditors named in 
Form AP. We use this information to explore whether all component auditors are created equal. 
We find that the percentage of audit hours conducted by less competent component auditors and 
those with significant coordination and communication challenges exhibit significant associations 
with adverse outcomes. This implies that auditors can reduce the potential for adverse audit 
outcomes by employing more competent component auditors. However, since our results show 
that component auditor use is structural and driven by client operations, lead auditors likely cannot 
control the countries in which they employ component auditors, and thus the coordination and 
communication challenges faced. Therefore, we conduct further analysis which finds that hiring 
competent component auditors in locations that are more prone to challenges can mitigate adverse 
outcomes. Overall, these findings can contribute to both practice (e.g., lead and component 
auditors, client management, investors) and future research using the new Form AP data to make 
decisions. 
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Although data made available by Form AP enhances the information environment, 
limitations still remain. For instance, we are unable to determine the identity or individual 
percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors who conduct less than five percent of 
the audit hours. Further, for those that do conduct more than five percent of audit hours, very little 
information is available other than their required reporting with the PCAOB, which we use to 
create competence measures. Since we largely do not have information on the identities of 
employees at these component auditors, we must make the assumption that characteristics (e.g., 
experience auditing U.S. clients, rule of law, English language proficiency, etc.) of the firm and 
the country it operates in apply to the audit team.   
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Appendix A: Example of Items 4.1 and 4.2 in Form AP 
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Appendix B: Variable definitions 
 
Test Variables Variable Definition 
COMPONENT-USE =1 if the lead auditor indicates in Form AP that at least one component auditor participated on the engagement, zero otherwise [Form AP] 
COMPONENT-NUMBER The number of component auditors that participated on the audit [Form AP] 
COMPONENT-PCT  The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors [Form AP] 
LOW-CPAS The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors with number of CPAs below the sample mean [Item 6.1 of PCAOB Form 2] 
HIGH-CPAS The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors with number of CPAs above the sample mean [Item 6.1 of PCAOB Form 2] 
LOW-USASSETS 
The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors with 
aggregate assets audited as a lead auditor on U.S. issuers below the sample 
mean 
HIGH-USASSETS 
The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors with 
aggregate assets audited as lead auditor on U.S. issuers above the sample 
mean 
NO-INDEXPERIENCE The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors with no other experience (as a lead or component auditor) in the client’s industry 
INDEXPERIENCE The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors with experience (as a lead or component auditor) in the client’s industry 
LOW-RULEOFLAW 
The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors operating 
in countries with rule of law below the sample mean [Worldwide 
Governance Indicators] 
HIGH-RULEOFLAW 
The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors operating 
in countries with rule of law above the sample mean [Worldwide 
Governance Indicators] 
LOW-ENGLISH The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors operating in countries with English proficiency below the sample mean [EF 2017] 
HIGH-ENGLISH The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors operating in countries with English proficiency above the sample mean [EF 2017] 
HIGH-TIMEDIFF The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors with time zone difference from the lead auditor’s office above the sample mean 
LOW-TIMEDIFF The percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors with time zone difference from the lead auditor’s office below the sample mean 
Dependent Variables  
MW =1 for companies disclosing a material weakness in their SOX section 302/404, zero otherwise [Audit Analytics] 
RESTATEMENT =1 for companies that misstated their financial reports, zero otherwise [Audit Analytics] 
DISC-ACC 
The absolute value of abnormal accruals derived from the difference 
between expected accruals estimated with the modified Jones model 
augmented with lag ROA [Compustat] 
AUDIT-DELAY 
The number of days between the fiscal year end date and the audit report 
date minus the SEC’s filing deadline requirement (60, 75, and 90 days for 
large accelerated, accelerated, and non-accelerated, respectively) [Audit 
Analytics] 
AUDIT-FEES The natural log of audit fees [Audit Analytics] 
Control Variables  
SIZE Natural log of total assets [Compustat data] 
BUS-SEG The sum of reported business segments [Compustat Segment file] 
GEO-SEG The sum of reported geographic segments [Compustat Segment file] 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS = 1 if the company has nonzero foreign pretax income, zero otherwise [Compustat data] 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES Number of foreign subsidiaries [SeekEdgar] 
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US-SUBSIDIARIES Number of U.S. subsidiaries [SeekEdgar] 
ARC The natural log of the total number of distinct monetary XBRL tags in Item 
8 of the 10-K flings [http://www.xbrlresearch.com]] 
LOSS = 1 if the company reported a net loss in the current or prior year, zero 
otherwise [Compustat data NI] 
LEVERAGE The ratio of total liabilities to total assets DLC+ DLTT)/AT)[Compustat] 
EXTREME-GROWTH An indicator variable that equals one if the year-over-year industry adjusted 
sales growth falls in the top quintile, zero otherwise (Doyle et al. 2007) 
[Compustat] 
INV-REC The ratio of inventory + accounts receivable to total assets [Compustat] 
BIG4 =1 for a Big 4 auditor, zero otherwise [Audit Analytics] 
AGE The natural log of number of years the firm has Compustat data [Compustat] 
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Table 1 – Derivation of balanced panel sample 
 
U.S. public issuers with Form AP in PCAOB AuditorSearch with an audit report due date 
between June 2017 and June 2018 
7,271 
Less: Non-U.S. lead auditor (956) 
Less: Missing or duplicate CIK (395) 
Less: Missing Compustat or Audit Analytics coverage (1,887) 
Potential companies in sample 4,033 
  
Less: Missing data in Compustat or Audit Analytics for audit fee model control variables  (153) 
Companies in audit fee sample in Table 4 (H1) 
 
Less: Engagements not using at least one component auditor 
Companies in audit fee sample in Tables 5 and 6 (H1) 
 
Less: Engagements not using at least one component auditor that individually contributes 
5 percent of total audit hours 
Companies in audit fee sample in Tables 7 and 8 (H2 and H3)  
3,880 
 
(2,445) 
1,435 
 
 
(529) 
906 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A – Test variables 
Variable name N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
COMPONENT-USE 3,880 0.370 0.000 0.483 0.000 1.000 
COMPONENT-NUMBER 1,435 3.596 2.000 3.746 1.000 5.000 
COMPONENT-PCT 1,435 17.997 15.000 16.409 2.500 28.000 
Variables used in H2 and H3       
COMPONENT-PCT  
(separately listed) 
906 21.624 15.000 13.383 7.500 30.00 
HIGH-RULEOFLAW 906 14.559 15.000 11.457 7.500 22.500 
LOW-RULEOFLAW 906 7.062 0.000 11.993 0.000 7.500 
HIGH-ENGLISH 906 12.193 7.500 10.566 7.500 15.000 
LOW-ENGLISH 906 9.428 7.500 12.733 0.000 15.000 
LOW-TIMEDIFF 906 14.748 15.000 12.622 7.500 22.500 
HIGH-TIMEDIFF 906 6.873 0.000 10.775 0.000 7.500 
HIGH-CPAS 906 10.584 7.500 11.041 0.000 15.000 
LOW-CPAS 906 11.036 7.500 12.377 0.000 15.000 
HIGH-USASSETS 906 7.703 7.500 9.891 0.000 15.000 
LOW-USASSETS 906 13.918 8.500 13.296 0.000 22.500 
INDEXPERIENCE 906 10.450 7.500 11.285 0.000 15.000 
NO-INDEXPERIENCE 906 11.171 7.500 13.102 0.000 15.000 
 
Panel B – Unique component auditors 
N = 303 Mean Median Std. Dev. 25th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Number of engagements 4.974 2.000 7.581 1.000 5.000 
Amount of assets audited (in millions $) 11,662.995 1,006.455 37,225.048 108.500 5,963.079 
Amount of sales audited (in millions $) 5,658.067 577.261 14,544.220 77.182 3,874.036 
Lead auditor on U.S. issuer 0.452 0.000s 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Number of U.S. issuers as lead auditors 5.122 0.000 13.442 0.000 4.000 
Member of affiliated network 0.927 1.000 0.260 1.000 1.000 
Big 4 affiliate 0.620 1.000 0.486 0.000 1.000 
Number of years registered with PCAOB 11.478 13.000 3.242 12.000 13.000 
Cut-offs used in H2 and H3      
Rule of law – above average 0.604 1.000 0.490 0.000 1.000 
English language proficiency – above average 0.475 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Time difference – above average 0.389 0.000 0.488 0.000 1.000 
Number of CPAs – above average 0.221 0.000 0.416 0.000 0.000 
Assets as lead on U.S. issuer – above average  0.109 0.000 0.312 0.000 0.000 
Experience in client’s industry 0.221 0.000 0.416 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel C – Unique component auditors by country 
 Number of unique components 
Number of 
engagements 
Dollar value of assets 
audited (in millions $) 
Argentina 4 12 35,895.07 
Australia 7 52 68,691.09 
Belgium 6 31 55,661.23 
Bermuda 3 7 22,740.26 
Brazil 6 78 149,299.29 
Canada 8 70 136,724.33 
Chile 3 9 33,503.52 
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China 15 124 115,347.52 
Costa Rica 3 5 22,833.94 
Czech Republic 5 9 2,579.94 
Denmark 4 6 4,043.68 
France 7 66 89,046.24 
Germany 13 137 109,260.59 
Hong Kong 7 17 6,881.40 
Hungary 5 10 35,774.09 
India 14 44 104,657.41 
Indonesia 3 3 24,838.95 
Ireland 5 50 141,104.08 
Israel 6 14 7,076.36 
Italy 7 32 79,974.75 
Japan 7 50 398,454.89 
Korea 4 15 7,377.94 
Luxembourg 4 5 7,292.12 
Malaysia 4 16 36,636.92 
Mexico 9 72 237,363.45 
Netherlands 7 61 113,632.82 
Norway 4 10 12,800.55 
Pakistan 3 3 980.62 
Philippines 4 16 28,943.48 
Poland 5 26 13,461.62 
Romania 4 5 4,004.28 
Russia 5 16 11,703.82 
Singapore 10 31 28,628.96 
South Africa 7 9 3,179.75 
Spain 5 16 12,147.47 
Sweden 6 19 6,360.80 
Switzerland 6 38 55,428.23 
Taiwan 7 15 10,842.48 
Thailand 4 9 51,388.90 
United Arab Emirates 5 7 6,949.34 
United Kingdom 13 226 1,157,226.70 
United States 9 9 973.37 
Countries with less than 3 
unique component auditors42 40 57 82,175.37 
Total 303 1,507 3,533,887.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
42 Austria, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Latvia, Macao, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Slovakia, and 
Trinidad and Tobago all have two unique component auditors. Algeria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, 
Cayman Islands, Egypt, Ghana, Greece, Iceland, Jamaica, Jersey, Lithuania, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Turkey, and 
Vietnam all have one unique component auditor. The total assets audited by component auditors is an approximation 
based on the percentage of audit hours.  
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel D – Dependent and control variables 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
MW 3,880 0.136 0.000 0.342 0.000 0.000 
RESTATEMENT 3,880 0.034 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.000 
DISC-ACC 2,601 0.082 0.047 0.102 0.020 0.098 
AUDIT-DELAY 3,880 -7.010 -6.000 10.162 -13.000 -1.000 
Audit fees (in thousands $) 3,880 2,526.386 1,136.640 4,065.459 417.250 2,735.430 
AUDIT-FEES 3,880 13.879 13.944 1.369 12.941 14.822 
Total assets (in millions $) 3,880 8,559.500 1,123.638 25,576.158 195.570 4,738.000 
SIZE 3,880 6.819 7.024 2.400 5.276 8.463 
BUS-SEG 3,880 1.777 1.000 1.371 1.000 3.000 
GEO-SEG 3,880 1.799 1.000 2.025 0.000 3.000 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS 3,880 0.446 0.000 0.497 0.000 1.000 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES 3,880 1.203 0.000 1.561 0.000 2.197 
US-SUBSIDIARIES 3,880 1.807 1.792 1.580 0.000 2.890 
ARC 3,880 5.811 5.829 0.413 5.521 6.118 
LOSS 3,880 0.432 0.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 
LEVERAGE 3,880 0.286 0.227 0.296 0.053 0.420 
EXTREME-GROWTH 3,880 0.182 0.000 0.386 0.000 0.000 
INV-REC 3,880 0.266 0.195 0.244 0.064 0.395 
BIG4 3,880 0.637 1.000 0.481 0.000 1.000 
AGE 3,880 22.473 19.000 16.998 9.000 30.000 
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Table 3 - Determinants of component auditor use 
 (1) (2) 
 COMPONENT-USE COMPONENT-USE 
SIZE 0.477*** 
(15.99) 
0.133*** 
(3.30) 
LOSS 0.309*** 
(3.11) 
0.101 
(0.88) 
LEVERAGE 0.284* 
(1.86) 
0.257 
(1.48) 
EXTREME-GROWTH -0.090 
(-0.81) 
0.015 
(0.12) 
INV-REC 1.126*** 
(4.14) 
0.693** 
(2.32) 
BIG4 0.317*** 
(2.69) 
0.132 
(0.99) 
AGE 0.177*** 
(2.92) 
-0.056 
(-0.80) 
BUS-SEG  
 
0.083* 
(1.85) 
GEO-SEG  
 
0.213*** 
(7.03) 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS  
 
0.942*** 
(8.04) 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES  
 
0.606*** 
(12.45) 
US-SUBSIDIARIES  
 
-0.212*** 
(-4.85) 
ARC  
 
0.838*** 
(4.09) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included 
Constant -5.605*** 
(-15.97) 
-7.869*** 
(-7.39) 
Observations 3,854 3,854 
Pseudo R2 0.273 0.410 
 
This table reports results of regressions of client characteristics on COMPONENT-USE. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Regressions include year and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firms. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. Two-tailed statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4 - H1: Component auditor use and audit outcomes 
 
Panel A - Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MW RESTATEMENT DISC-ACC AUDIT-DELAY AUDIT-FEES 
COMPONENT-USE 0.421*** 
(2.98) 
-0.288 
(-1.08) 
0.000 
(0.10) 
0.783* 
(1.76) 
0.124*** 
(5.88) 
SIZE -0.396*** 
(-8.30) 
-0.246*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.017*** 
(-10.78) 
-1.490*** 
(-10.67) 
0.356*** 
(53.59) 
BUS-SEG 0.026 
(0.49) 
-0.062 
(-0.68) 
0.001 
(0.47) 
0.107 
(0.69) 
0.021*** 
(2.87) 
GEO-SEG 0.011 
(0.32) 
0.123** 
(2.28) 
-0.002** 
(-2.30) 
-0.177* 
(-1.68) 
0.017*** 
(3.40) 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS -0.441*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.325 
(-1.19) 
-0.005 
(-1.06) 
-0.630 
(-1.35) 
0.105*** 
(4.73) 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES 0.097 
(1.64) 
0.153 
(1.58) 
0.001 
(0.72) 
0.433** 
(2.48) 
0.072*** 
(8.66) 
US-SUBSIDIARIES -0.048 
(-0.94) 
-0.105 
(-1.28) 
0.000 
(0.19) 
0.342** 
(2.38) 
0.010 
(1.40) 
ARC 1.552*** 
(6.73) 
2.463*** 
(6.07) 
0.036*** 
(4.60) 
5.929*** 
(8.51) 
0.525*** 
(15.88) 
LOSS 0.434*** 
(3.34) 
0.135 
(0.59) 
0.017*** 
(3.97) 
-0.514 
(-1.27) 
0.164*** 
(8.59) 
LEVERAGE 0.330** 
(2.08) 
-0.424 
(-1.22) 
0.019*** 
(3.02) 
1.590*** 
(2.65) 
0.023 
(0.82) 
EXTREME-GROWTH 0.103 
(0.79) 
0.022 
(0.09) 
0.029*** 
(6.05) 
0.534 
(1.25) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
INV-REC 0.422 
(1.33) 
-0.334 
(-0.53) 
-0.021* 
(-1.68) 
0.467 
(0.44) 
0.062 
(1.24) 
BIG4 -0.356** 
(-2.47) 
-0.053 
(-0.20) 
-0.005 
(-1.04) 
-1.178** 
(-2.56) 
0.585*** 
(26.77) 
AGE -0.422*** 
(-5.70) 
-0.405*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.008*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.095 
(-0.40) 
-0.016 
(-1.39) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -7.492*** 
(-6.33) 
-14.801*** 
(-6.89) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-31.302*** 
(-8.77) 
7.586*** 
(44.75) 
Observations 3,782 3,439 2,601 3,880 3,880 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.162 0.113 0.222 0.071 0.884 
 
Panel B - Propensity score matched sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MW RESTATEMENT DISC-ACC AUDIT-DELAY AUDIT-FEES 
COMPONENT-USE 0.466*** 
(2.64) 
-0.232 
(-0.69) 
0.002 
(0.33) 
1.013* 
(1.78) 
0.137*** 
(5.21) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -6.909*** 
(-3.63) 
-13.313*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.053 
(-0.60) 
-30.200*** 
(-4.55) 
7.815*** 
(25.55) 
Observations 1,278 1,278 644 1,278 1,278 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.179 0.119 0.165 0.045 0.843 
 
This table tests H1 and reports results of regressions of COMPONENT-USE on several dependent variables, with Panel A using 
the full sample and Panel B using a propensity score matched sample. Variables are defined in Appendix B. Regressions include 
year and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firms. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Two-tailed statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5 - H1: Number of component auditors involved in the audit and audit outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MW RESTATEMENT DISC-ACC AUDIT-DELAY AUDIT-FEES 
COMPONENT-NUMBER 0.047 
(1.48) 
0.027 
(0.63) 
0.001 
(1.22) 
0.050 
(0.60) 
0.042*** 
(11.18) 
SIZE -0.460*** 
(-5.40) 
-0.102 
(-0.73) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.04) 
-1.465*** 
(-6.50) 
0.366*** 
(35.63) 
BUS-SEG 0.024 
(0.31) 
-0.014 
(-0.11) 
-0.002 
(-0.92) 
0.252 
(1.18) 
0.026*** 
(2.71) 
GEO-SEG 0.029 
(0.68) 
0.160** 
(2.39) 
-0.001 
(-1.28) 
-0.117 
(-0.92) 
0.006 
(1.10) 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS -0.036 
(-0.14) 
0.220 
(0.41) 
-0.018** 
(-2.44) 
0.238 
(0.30) 
0.101*** 
(2.82) 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES 0.003 
(0.03) 
-0.100 
(-0.67) 
-0.000 
(-0.10) 
0.386 
(1.53) 
0.057*** 
(5.02) 
US-SUBSIDIARIES 0.054 
(0.58) 
0.078 
(0.47) 
-0.000 
(-0.18) 
0.235 
(0.90) 
-0.002 
(-0.13) 
ARC 1.477*** 
(3.68) 
2.172*** 
(3.07) 
0.010 
(0.99) 
4.984*** 
(4.45) 
0.390*** 
(7.66) 
LOSS 0.316 
(1.57) 
0.297 
(0.84) 
0.027*** 
(5.35) 
-1.358** 
(-2.27) 
0.129*** 
(4.72) 
LEVERAGE 0.496 
(1.51) 
-0.787 
(-1.07) 
-0.006 
(-0.64) 
0.806 
(0.73) 
-0.022 
(-0.44) 
EXTREME-GROWTH -0.014 
(-0.06) 
-0.576 
(-1.11) 
0.026*** 
(4.12) 
0.257 
(0.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
INV-REC 0.516 
(0.86) 
0.513 
(0.42) 
-0.063*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.560 
(-0.30) 
0.235*** 
(2.78) 
BIG4 -0.274 
(-1.10) 
-0.583 
(-1.15) 
-0.004 
(-0.57) 
-0.627 
(-0.77) 
0.477*** 
(12.89) 
AGE -0.640*** 
(-4.91) 
-0.142 
(-0.59) 
-0.007** 
(-2.00) 
-0.967** 
(-2.42) 
-0.056*** 
(-3.10) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -5.946*** 
(-2.85) 
-15.140*** 
(-3.93) 
0.112** 
(2.14) 
-24.722*** 
(-4.19) 
8.641*** 
(32.15) 
Observations 1,340 1,054 1,151 1,435 1,435 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.157 0.129 0.177 0.045 0.871 
 
This table tests H1 and reports results of regressions of COMPONENT-NUMBER on several dependent variables. Variables are 
defined in Appendix B. Regressions include year and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by 
firms. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Two-tailed statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
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Table 6 - H1: Percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors and audit outcomes 
 
Panel A - Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MW RESTATEMENT DISC-ACC AUDIT-DELAY AUDIT-FEES 
COMPONENT-PCT 0.018*** 
(3.09) 
0.025** 
(2.57) 
-0.000 
(-0.83) 
0.050*** 
(2.80) 
0.003*** 
(3.53) 
SIZE -0.447*** 
(-5.32) 
-0.116 
(-0.85) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.79) 
-1.459*** 
(-6.69) 
0.393*** 
(37.94) 
BUS-SEG 0.019 
(0.24) 
-0.008 
(-0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.79) 
0.232 
(1.09) 
0.030*** 
(2.97) 
GEO-SEG 0.010 
(0.23) 
0.124* 
(1.78) 
-0.001 
(-0.98) 
-0.174 
(-1.35) 
0.011* 
(1.83) 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS -0.025 
(-0.10) 
0.229 
(0.43) 
-0.018** 
(-2.53) 
0.273 
(0.35) 
0.079** 
(2.14) 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES -0.037 
(-0.41) 
-0.190 
(-1.24) 
0.001 
(0.41) 
0.219 
(0.86) 
0.076*** 
(6.26) 
US-SUBSIDIARIES 0.092 
(0.97) 
0.161 
(0.94) 
-0.001 
(-0.58) 
0.371 
(1.41) 
-0.016 
(-1.26) 
ARC 1.446*** 
(3.58) 
2.046*** 
(2.81) 
0.012 
(1.17) 
4.739*** 
(4.24) 
0.408*** 
(7.68) 
LOSS 0.326 
(1.62) 
0.304 
(0.85) 
0.027*** 
(5.27) 
-1.320** 
(-2.21) 
0.125*** 
(4.41) 
LEVERAGE 0.531 
(1.60) 
-0.710 
(-0.97) 
-0.006 
(-0.63) 
0.827 
(0.75) 
-0.008 
(-0.15) 
EXTREME-GROWTH -0.021 
(-0.09) 
-0.563 
(-1.07) 
0.026*** 
(4.13) 
0.272 
(0.38) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
INV-REC 0.397 
(0.65) 
0.116 
(0.09) 
-0.060*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.929 
(-0.50) 
0.251*** 
(2.84) 
BIG4 -0.230 
(-0.92) 
-0.516 
(-1.01) 
-0.005 
(-0.72) 
-0.512 
(-0.63) 
0.462*** 
(12.01) 
AGE -0.639*** 
(-4.88) 
-0.124 
(-0.51) 
-0.007* 
(-1.90) 
-0.961** 
(-2.42) 
-0.043** 
(-2.26) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -5.913*** 
(-2.84) 
-14.510*** 
(-3.74) 
0.098* 
(1.86) 
-23.621*** 
(-4.03) 
8.350*** 
(29.97) 
Observations 1,340 1,054 1,151 1,435 1,435 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.163 0.144 0.176 0.050 0.860 
 
Panel B - Propensity score matched sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MW RESTATEMENT DISC-ACC AUDIT-DELAY AUDIT-FEES 
COMPONENT-PCT 0.020*** 
(3.04) 
0.026** 
(2.41) 
-0.000 
(-0.78) 
0.073*** 
(3.36) 
0.003*** 
(2.73) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -4.085* 
(-1.67) 
-14.788*** 
(-3.27) 
0.191** 
(2.44) 
-24.374*** 
(-2.88) 
8.410*** 
(21.22) 
Observations 806 806 564 806 806 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.152 0.096 0.178 0.076 0.852 
 
This table tests H1 and reports results of regressions of COMPONENT-PCT on several dependent variables, with Panel A using 
the full sample and Panel B using a propensity score matched sample. Variables are defined in Appendix B. Regressions include 
year and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firms. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Two-tailed statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7 - H2: Percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors with coordination and 
communication challenges 
 
Panel A - Rule of Law 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MW RESTATEMENT DISC-ACC AUDIT-DELAY AUDIT-FEES 
HIGH-RULEOFLAW -0.006 
(-0.56) 
0.020 
(1.24) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
0.041 
(1.39) 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
LOW-RULEOFLAW 0.028*** 
(3.07) 
0.026* 
(1.82) 
-0.000 
(-0.80) 
0.095*** 
(3.18) 
-0.000 
(-0.35) 
SIZE -0.425*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.205 
(-1.26) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.07) 
-1.319*** 
(-4.84) 
0.402*** 
(31.21) 
BUS-SEG 0.086 
(0.89) 
0.027 
(0.20) 
-0.001 
(-0.51) 
0.221 
(0.87) 
0.019 
(1.61) 
GEO-SEG 0.042 
(0.77) 
0.146* 
(1.89) 
-0.001 
(-0.79) 
-0.115 
(-0.75) 
0.019*** 
(2.58) 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS -0.146 
(-0.40) 
-0.010 
(-0.02) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.69) 
-2.261** 
(-1.97) 
0.150*** 
(2.77) 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES -0.014 
(-0.11) 
-0.038 
(-0.21) 
0.002 
(0.67) 
0.182 
(0.55) 
0.099*** 
(6.37) 
US-SUBSIDIARIES 0.069 
(0.50) 
-0.086 
(-0.43) 
-0.002 
(-0.74) 
0.273 
(0.78) 
-0.040** 
(-2.40) 
ARC 0.813 
(1.42) 
1.957** 
(2.14) 
0.014 
(1.26) 
4.535*** 
(3.09) 
0.389*** 
(5.62) 
LOSS 0.415 
(1.64) 
0.442 
(1.12) 
0.024*** 
(4.42) 
-1.236* 
(-1.71) 
0.111*** 
(3.24) 
LEVERAGE 0.658 
(1.39) 
-0.469 
(-0.55) 
-0.017 
(-1.53) 
0.751 
(0.51) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
EXTREME-GROWTH -0.206 
(-0.61) 
-0.781 
(-1.27) 
0.027*** 
(3.78) 
0.097 
(0.10) 
-0.034 
(-0.78) 
INV-REC 0.908 
(1.12) 
-2.050 
(-1.26) 
-0.027 
(-1.42) 
-1.623 
(-0.67) 
0.378*** 
(3.32) 
BIG4 0.121 
(0.36) 
-0.259 
(-0.45) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.324 
(-0.31) 
0.449*** 
(9.10) 
AGE -0.680*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.038 
(-0.14) 
-0.007* 
(-1.77) 
-1.112** 
(-2.27) 
-0.030 
(-1.28) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -3.406 
(-1.14) 
-12.537*** 
(-2.68) 
0.061 
(1.03) 
-23.222*** 
(-3.01) 
8.539*** 
(23.43) 
Observations 810 665 746 906 906 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.194 0.150 0.167 0.085 0.867 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Panel B - English language proficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MW RESTATEMENT DISC-ACC AUDIT-DELAY AUDIT-FEES 
HIGH-ENGLISH -0.004 
(-0.35) 
0.021 
(1.23) 
-0.000 
(-0.91) 
0.027 
(0.84) 
-0.001 
(-0.87) 
LOW-ENGLISH 0.025*** 
(2.76) 
0.026* 
(1.77) 
-0.000 
(-0.03) 
0.093*** 
(3.35) 
-0.000 
(-0.22) 
SIZE -0.425*** 
(-3.80) 
-0.206 
(-1.26) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.09) 
-1.325*** 
(-4.86) 
0.402*** 
(31.21) 
BUS-SEG 0.087 
(0.92) 
0.028 
(0.20) 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
0.224 
(0.88) 
0.019 
(1.62) 
GEO-SEG 0.039 
(0.73) 
0.146* 
(1.89) 
-0.001 
(-0.74) 
-0.114 
(-0.74) 
0.019*** 
(2.59) 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS -0.142 
(-0.39) 
-0.001 
(-0.00) 
-0.025*** 
(-2.67) 
-2.280** 
(-1.99) 
0.150*** 
(2.77) 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES -0.030 
(-0.24) 
-0.037 
(-0.20) 
0.002 
(0.62) 
0.174 
(0.53) 
0.099*** 
(6.36) 
US-SUBSIDIARIES 0.058 
(0.42) 
-0.089 
(-0.45) 
-0.002 
(-0.72) 
0.272 
(0.78) 
-0.040** 
(-2.40) 
ARC 0.793 
(1.38) 
1.951** 
(2.14) 
0.014 
(1.24) 
4.519*** 
(3.08) 
0.389*** 
(5.62) 
LOSS 0.436* 
(1.73) 
0.451 
(1.14) 
0.024*** 
(4.48) 
-1.166 
(-1.61) 
0.112*** 
(3.28) 
LEVERAGE 0.640 
(1.36) 
-0.474 
(-0.56) 
-0.017 
(-1.52) 
0.740 
(0.50) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
EXTREME-GROWTH -0.202 
(-0.60) 
-0.786 
(-1.28) 
0.027*** 
(3.85) 
0.127 
(0.14) 
-0.034 
(-0.76) 
INV-REC 0.917 
(1.14) 
-2.046 
(-1.26) 
-0.029 
(-1.54) 
-1.635 
(-0.68) 
0.376*** 
(3.31) 
BIG4 0.105 
(0.31) 
-0.273 
(-0.48) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
-0.292 
(-0.28) 
0.450*** 
(9.13) 
AGE -0.688*** 
(-4.11) 
-0.038 
(-0.14) 
-0.006 
(-1.64) 
-1.098** 
(-2.24) 
-0.029 
(-1.25) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -3.264 
(-1.09) 
-12.513*** 
(-2.68) 
0.060 
(1.01) 
-23.140*** 
(-3.01) 
8.535*** 
(23.43) 
Observations 810 665 746 906 906 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.189 0.150 0.167 0.086 0.867 
  
52 
 
Table 7 (continued) 
Panel C - Time zone differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MW RESTATEMENT DISC-ACC AUDIT-DELAY AUDIT-
FEES 
LOW-TIMEDIFF 0.013 
(1.29) 
0.011 
(0.74) 
-0.000 
(-0.78) 
0.051* 
(1.83) 
-0.000 
(-0.36) 
HIGH-TIMEDIFF 0.020* 
(1.94) 
0.041** 
(2.47) 
0.000 
(0.13) 
0.096*** 
(2.91) 
-0.001 
(-0.66) 
SIZE -0.416*** 
(-3.76) 
-0.208 
(-1.28) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.13) 
-1.340*** 
(-4.91) 
0.402*** 
(31.17) 
BUS-SEG 0.089 
(0.94) 
0.027 
(0.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
0.218 
(0.86) 
0.019 
(1.62) 
GEO-SEG 0.028 
(0.52) 
0.147* 
(1.89) 
-0.001 
(-0.79) 
-0.125 
(-0.81) 
0.019*** 
(2.58) 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS -0.120 
(-0.33) 
0.047 
(0.07) 
-0.025*** 
(-2.67) 
-2.320** 
(-2.03) 
0.150*** 
(2.76) 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES -0.027 
(-0.22) 
-0.049 
(-0.27) 
0.002 
(0.66) 
0.191 
(0.58) 
0.099*** 
(6.38) 
US-SUBSIDIARIES 0.055 
(0.41) 
-0.064 
(-0.32) 
-0.002 
(-0.70) 
0.268 
(0.76) 
-0.040** 
(-2.42) 
ARC 0.818 
(1.43) 
2.093** 
(2.27) 
0.015 
(1.32) 
4.722*** 
(3.19) 
0.386*** 
(5.53) 
LOSS 0.392 
(1.58) 
0.480 
(1.21) 
0.024*** 
(4.44) 
-1.237* 
(-1.71) 
0.111*** 
(3.23) 
LEVERAGE 0.667 
(1.43) 
-0.298 
(-0.36) 
-0.017 
(-1.45) 
0.899 
(0.60) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
EXTREME-GROWTH -0.222 
(-0.67) 
-0.815 
(-1.31) 
0.027*** 
(3.85) 
0.097 
(0.10) 
-0.035 
(-0.79) 
INV-REC 1.029 
(1.29) 
-1.815 
(-1.12) 
-0.028 
(-1.46) 
-1.405 
(-0.58) 
0.377*** 
(3.31) 
BIG4 0.054 
(0.16) 
-0.169 
(-0.29) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.206 
(-0.19) 
0.445*** 
(8.92) 
AGE -0.723*** 
(-4.34) 
-0.034 
(-0.13) 
-0.006* 
(-1.67) 
-1.135** 
(-2.32) 
-0.031 
(-1.32) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -3.268 
(-1.09) 
-13.587*** 
(-2.85) 
0.054 
(0.91) 
-24.146*** 
(-3.10) 
8.563*** 
(23.23) 
Observations 810 665 746 906 906 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.180 0.158 0.167 0.084 0.867 
 
This table tests H2 and reports results of regressions of several sets of variables that capture work conducted by those with more 
and less coordination and communication challenges on several dependent variables, with Panel A examining rule of law, Panel B 
English language proficiency, and Panel C time zone differences. Variables are defined in Appendix B. Regressions include year 
and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firms. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Two-
tailed statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 8 - H3: Percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors with high versus low competence 
and audit outcomes 
 
Panel A - Number of CPAs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  MW RESTATEMENT DISC-
ACC 
AUDIT-
DELAY 
AUDIT-
FEES 
HIGH-CPAS  0.009 
(0.83) 
0.009 
(0.51) 
-0.000 
(-0.18) 
0.034 
(1.06) 
0.000 
(0.31) 
LOW-CPAS  0.020** 
(2.12) 
0.035** 
(2.28) 
-0.000 
(-0.56) 
0.095*** 
(3.28) 
-0.002 
(-1.14) 
SIZE  -0.414*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.198 
(-1.21) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.08) 
-1.312*** 
(-4.81) 
0.402*** 
(31.21) 
BUS-SEG  0.089 
(0.94) 
0.042 
(0.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.51) 
0.229 
(0.90) 
0.019 
(1.60) 
GEO-SEG  0.030 
(0.57) 
0.144* 
(1.87) 
-0.001 
(-0.76) 
-0.117 
(-0.77) 
0.019** 
(2.57) 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS  -0.123 
(-0.34) 
0.034 
(0.05) 
-0.025*** 
(-2.67) 
-2.297** 
(-2.01) 
0.149*** 
(2.75) 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES  -0.028 
(-0.23) 
-0.062 
(-0.34) 
0.002 
(0.68) 
0.138 
(0.42) 
0.101*** 
(6.46) 
US-SUBSIDIARIES  0.052 
(0.38) 
-0.068 
(-0.34) 
-0.002 
(-0.74) 
0.281 
(0.80) 
-0.041** 
(-2.46) 
ARC  0.774 
(1.36) 
2.006** 
(2.19) 
0.014 
(1.24) 
4.569*** 
(3.12) 
0.386*** 
(5.57) 
LOSS  0.390 
(1.57) 
0.422 
(1.06) 
0.024*** 
(4.43) 
-1.251* 
(-1.73) 
0.111*** 
(3.23) 
LEVERAGE  0.619 
(1.34) 
-0.518 
(-0.61) 
-0.017 
(-1.52) 
0.741 
(0.50) 
0.004 
(0.06) 
EXTREME-GROWTH  -0.211 
(-0.64) 
-0.785 
(-1.26) 
0.027*** 
(3.78) 
0.114 
(0.12) 
-0.036 
(-0.82) 
INV-REC  0.957 
(1.20) 
-2.349 
(-1.42) 
-0.028 
(-1.45) 
-1.714 
(-0.71) 
0.385*** 
(3.39) 
BIG4  0.103 
(0.30) 
-0.117 
(-0.20) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.009 
(-0.01) 
0.434*** 
(8.59) 
AGE  -0.730*** 
(-4.40) 
-0.022 
(-0.08) 
-0.006* 
(-1.72) 
-1.146** 
(-2.35) 
-0.031 
(-1.34) 
Industry fixed effects  Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant  -3.033 
(-1.02) 
-13.088*** 
(-2.77) 
0.062 
(1.03) 
-23.576*** 
(-3.05) 
8.576*** 
(23.51) 
Observations  810 665 746 906 906 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2  0.181 0.155 0.166 0.086 0.867 
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Table 8 (continued)  
Panel B - Assets as a lead on U.S. issuers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  MW RESTATEMENT DISC-
ACC 
AUDIT-
DELAY 
AUDIT-
FEES 
HIGH-USASSETS  0.006 
(0.45) 
0.016 
(0.78) 
-0.000 
(-0.88) 
0.080** 
(2.19) 
0.001 
(0.44) 
LOW-USASSETS  0.019** 
(2.17) 
0.027* 
(1.93) 
-0.000 
(-0.10) 
0.063** 
(2.32) 
-0.001 
(-1.03) 
SIZE  -0.418*** 
(-3.77) 
-0.207 
(-1.27) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.12) 
-1.318*** 
(-4.83) 
0.402*** 
(31.25) 
BUS-SEG  0.084 
(0.89) 
0.022 
(0.16) 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
0.227 
(0.89) 
0.020* 
(1.65) 
GEO-SEG  0.033 
(0.62) 
0.147* 
(1.91) 
-0.001 
(-0.74) 
-0.122 
(-0.80) 
0.018** 
(2.54) 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS  -0.158 
(-0.43) 
-0.034 
(-0.05) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.70) 
-2.290** 
(-1.99) 
0.153*** 
(2.82) 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES  -0.020 
(-0.17) 
-0.045 
(-0.25) 
0.002 
(0.63) 
0.191 
(0.58) 
0.100*** 
(6.40) 
US-SUBSIDIARIES  0.057 
(0.42) 
-0.075 
(-0.38) 
-0.002 
(-0.65) 
0.247 
(0.70) 
-0.041** 
(-2.48) 
ARC  0.773 
(1.36) 
1.989** 
(2.16) 
0.014 
(1.27) 
4.471*** 
(3.04) 
0.387*** 
(5.58) 
LOSS  0.387 
(1.56) 
0.439 
(1.11) 
0.023*** 
(4.40) 
-1.260* 
(-1.74) 
0.111*** 
(3.25) 
LEVERAGE  0.670 
(1.44) 
-0.446 
(-0.52) 
-0.017 
(-1.48) 
0.793 
(0.53) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
EXTREME-GROWTH  -0.233 
(-0.71) 
-0.786 
(-1.28) 
0.027*** 
(3.81) 
0.076 
(0.08) 
-0.033 
(-0.76) 
INV-REC  0.979 
(1.23) 
-2.015 
(-1.24) 
-0.029 
(-1.50) 
-1.499 
(-0.62) 
0.379*** 
(3.33) 
BIG4  0.143 
(0.40) 
-0.173 
(-0.29) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
-0.579 
(-0.53) 
0.430*** 
(8.32) 
AGE  -0.727*** 
(-4.37) 
-0.043 
(-0.16) 
-0.006* 
(-1.69) 
-1.172** 
(-2.40) 
-0.030 
(-1.32) 
Industry fixed effects  Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant  -3.060 
(-1.03) 
-12.771*** 
(-2.71) 
0.058 
(0.98) 
-22.383*** 
(-2.90) 
8.571*** 
(23.51) 
Observations  810 665 746 906 906 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2  0.181 0.151 0.167 0.083 0.867 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Panel C -  Industry experience 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  MW RESTATEMENT DISC-
ACC 
AUDIT-
DELAY 
AUDIT-
FEES 
INDEXPERIENCE  0.006 
(0.49) 
0.017 
(0.97) 
-0.000 
(-0.00) 
0.056* 
(1.71) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
NO-INDEXPERIENCE  0.022** 
(2.33) 
0.028* 
(1.93) 
-0.000 
(-0.70) 
0.077*** 
(2.64) 
-0.002 
(-1.13) 
SIZE  -0.415*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.207 
(-1.27) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.09) 
-1.317*** 
(-4.83) 
0.402*** 
(31.21) 
BUS-SEG  0.088 
(0.93) 
0.027 
(0.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.50) 
0.218 
(0.86) 
0.020* 
(1.65) 
GEO-SEG  0.031 
(0.57) 
0.147* 
(1.91) 
-0.001 
(-0.77) 
-0.120 
(-0.79) 
0.019*** 
(2.58) 
FOREIGN-OPERATIONS  -0.109 
(-0.30) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.71) 
-2.292** 
(-2.00) 
0.147*** 
(2.72) 
FOREIGN-SUBSIDIARIES  -0.022 
(-0.18) 
-0.044 
(-0.24) 
0.002 
(0.68) 
0.188 
(0.57) 
0.099*** 
(6.39) 
US-SUBSIDIARIES  0.059 
(0.43) 
-0.072 
(-0.36) 
-0.002 
(-0.75) 
0.264 
(0.75) 
-0.041** 
(-2.46) 
ARC  0.808 
(1.42) 
1.994** 
(2.17) 
0.014 
(1.23) 
4.533*** 
(3.08) 
0.384*** 
(5.54) 
LOSS  0.399 
(1.60) 
0.461 
(1.17) 
0.024*** 
(4.44) 
-1.259* 
(-1.74) 
0.111*** 
(3.23) 
LEVERAGE  0.656 
(1.41) 
-0.436 
(-0.52) 
-0.017 
(-1.53) 
0.807 
(0.54) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
EXTREME-GROWTH  -0.220 
(-0.67) 
-0.780 
(-1.27) 
0.027*** 
(3.81) 
0.074 
(0.08) 
-0.035 
(-0.80) 
INV-REC  1.134 
(1.41) 
-1.972 
(-1.22) 
-0.029 
(-1.49) 
-1.403 
(-0.58) 
0.368*** 
(3.23) 
BIG4  0.164 
(0.47) 
-0.177 
(-0.30) 
-0.002 
(-0.26) 
-0.268 
(-0.25) 
0.431*** 
(8.42) 
AGE  -0.735*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.048 
(-0.18) 
-0.006* 
(-1.71) 
-1.170** 
(-2.39) 
-0.030 
(-1.30) 
Industry fixed effects  Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant  -3.353 
(-1.12) 
-12.868*** 
(-2.73) 
0.064 
(1.06) 
-23.072*** 
(-2.97) 
8.591*** 
(23.47) 
Observations  810 665 746 906 906 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2  0.182 0.151 0.166 0.083 0.867 
 
This table tests H3 and reports results of regressions of several sets of variables that capture work conducted by more and less 
competent component auditors on several dependent variables, with Panel A examining the number of CPAs, Panel B experience 
on U.S. audits, and Panel C industry experience. Variables are defined in Appendix B. Regressions include year and two-digit SIC 
code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firms. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Two-tailed statistical 
significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 9 - Additional analysis: Percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors with high and low 
competence in countries with and without coordination and communication challenges 
Panel A – Rule of law 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MW RESTATEMENT DISC-ACC AUDIT-DELAY AUDIT-FEES 
HIGH-RULEOFLAW -0.006 
(-0.50) 
0.020 
(1.22) 
-0.000 
(-0.04) 
0.044 
(1.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.81) 
LOW-RULEOFLAW- 
LOW-COMPETENCE 
0.034*** 
(3.30) 
0.026 
(1.61) 
-0.000* 
(-1.65) 
0.125*** 
(3.68) 
-0.003** 
(-2.06) 
LOW-RULEOFLAW- 
HIGH-COMPETENCE 
0.002 
(0.09) 
0.030 
(0.88) 
0.001 
(1.23) 
-0.017 
(-0.26) 
0.010*** 
(3.08) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -3.820 
(-1.27) 
-12.493*** 
(-2.66) 
0.074 
(1.24) 
-25.012*** 
(-3.22) 
8.703*** 
(23.86) 
Observations 810 665 746 906 906 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.196 0.150 0.169 0.088 0.869 
 
Panel B – English language proficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MW RESTATEMENT DISC-
ACC 
AUDIT-DELAY AUDIT-
FEES 
HIGH-ENGLISH -0.003 
(-0.29) 
0.021 
(1.25) 
-0.000 
(-1.02) 
0.030 
(0.92) 
-0.002 
(-1.04) 
LOW-ENGLISH- 
LOW-COMPETENCE 
0.034*** 
(3.31) 
0.033** 
(2.02) 
-0.000 
(-0.95) 
0.122*** 
(3.82) 
-0.003** 
(-2.06) 
LOW-ENGLISH- 
HIGH-COMPETENCE 
-0.005 
(-0.25) 
0.003 
(0.11) 
0.001 
(1.46) 
0.010 
(0.20) 
0.008*** 
(3.07) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -3.788 
(-1.26) 
-12.911*** 
(-2.76) 
0.072 
(1.20) 
-24.824*** 
(-3.21) 
8.697*** 
(23.89) 
Observations 810 665 746 906 906 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.194 0.153 0.169 0.089 0.869 
 
Panel C – Time zone differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MW RESTATEMENT DISC-
ACC 
AUDIT-DELAY AUDIT-
FEES 
LOW-TIMEDIFF  0.013 
(1.33) 
0.011 
(0.74) 
-0.000 
(-0.81) 
0.052* 
(1.86) 
-0.001 
(-0.41) 
HIGH-TIMEDIFF- 
LOW-COMPETENCE 
0.031*** 
(2.61) 
0.044** 
(2.33) 
-0.000 
(-0.42) 
0.133*** 
(3.44) 
-0.005*** 
(-2.68) 
HIGH-TIMEDIFF- 
HIGH-COMPETENCE 
-0.018 
(-0.78) 
0.032 
(1.03) 
0.000 
(0.90) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
0.009*** 
(3.06) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -3.831 
(-1.27) 
-13.756*** 
(-2.87) 
0.059 
(0.98) 
-25.591*** 
(-3.27) 
8.715*** 
(23.75) 
Observations 810 665 746 906 906 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.186 0.158 0.167 0.087 0.869 
This table reports results of regressions of several sets of variables that capture work conducted by more and less competent 
component auditors in countries with and without coordination and communication challenges on several dependent variables, with 
Panel A examining rule of law, Panel B English language proficiency, and Panel C time zone differences. Competence is 
determined based on the component auditor meeting at least two of the three competence criteria (i.e., employs above average 
number of CPAs, is the lead auditor on an above average amount of assets of U.S. issuers, and has experience as either a lead or 
component auditor on at least one additional client in the same industry). Variables are defined in Appendix B. Regressions include 
year and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firms. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Two-tailed statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
